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Does a liberal state have a legitimate interest in defining the terms of intimate 
relationships? Recently, several scholars have answered this question with a no and 
concluded that the state should abolish marriage, along with all other categories of 
intimate status. While politically infeasible, these proposals offer a powerful thought 
experiment. In this Article, I use this thought experiment to argue that the law cannot 
avoid relying on intimate-status norms and has legitimate reasons to retain an 
intimate status like marriage. 
The argument has three parts. The primary lesson of the thought experiment is 
that the state cannot abolish intimate status. Even if a state abolished formal status 
registries, private law would recreate ad hoc status distinctions. As long as intimates 
can bring claims against one another in contract, tort, or restitution, ordinary 
private-law doctrines will require judges or juries to interpret the parties’ legal 
rights in light of their relationship. The law might exempt intimates from these 
ordinary doctrines, but that would place a systemic status distinction at the heart of 
private law. 
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Second, these private-law tailoring doctrines inevitably rely on intimate status, 
because intimate norms are what moral philosophers call “imperfect duties.” A duty 
is imperfect when the actor has discretion to decide how and when to fulfill it. 
Whether a discretionary act fulfills an imperfect duty depends on whether it 
expresses the actor’s subjective commitment to the values and ends of the 
relationship. Consequently, the only way for a third party to make precise judgments 
about imperfect duties is to interpret the parties’ conduct in light of normative 
standards for that type of relationship. The law can enforce imperfect intimate duties 
only if it supplants the couple’s discretion to interpret their duties and replaces their 
commitment with legal sanctions. 
Finally, marital status offers a way to manage the tension created by imperfect 
intimate rights. The law refuses to enforce marital rights in ongoing relationships, 
which prevents the state from displacing couples’ discretion and commitment. When 
a couple separates, they abandon their commitment and thus lose their discretionary 
authority. At that point, the state may use equitable and egalitarian norms to protect 
the former spouses’ legitimate expectations. This combination of deferred protection 
and equitable remedies offers a framework for legally protected imperfect rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
The same-sex marriage controversy has kept marriage at the forefront of our 
national consciousness. Yet we have made little headway on the most fundamental 
question about marriage law: Why regulate marriage at all? Courts have demanded 
that the states identify some purpose for marriage that does not apply equally to 
same-sex couples or to identify some other reason for withholding same-sex 
marriage that does not bottom out in opposition to homosexuality, whether based in 
theology, morality, or prejudice.1 The arguments about tradition, procreation, and 
child rearing are now familiar, and few courts have found them convincing.2 
Consequently, these courts have found little need to inquire further into why the law 
regulates marriage.3 This blind spot is partly a result of the parties’ litigating 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (citing as examples 
of inappropriate justifications “both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral 
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) 
morality” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12–13 (1996)); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 
668–69 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 
384, 399–400 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 479–81 (Conn. 
2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 897–906 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961–68 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217–18 (N.J. 
2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 982–84 (Wash. 2006). 
 2. See, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 668–71; Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 383–85 (4th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1219–28 
(10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). But see DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
404–06 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). 
 3. See, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 658–60; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883–84. Two notable 
recent exceptions that discuss the state’s interest in legal regulation of marriage are In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 421–26, and Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954–57. 
The Supreme Court in Windsor artfully dodged this question. The Court concluded that the 
Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of marriage as “a legal union between one man and one 
2015] WHY THE STATE CANNOT “ABOLISH MARRIAGE” 1263 
 
positions: when the arguments against same-sex marriage come up short, the 
movements’ proponents have little incentive to question the foundations of civil 
marriage. More fundamentally, however, the blind spot represents an implicit 
baseline assumption that there is some legitimate reason to regulate intimate 
relationships.4 But what is it? Why may a liberal state legitimately dictate the terms 
of intimate relationships? 
One promising way to start is to consider the opposite scenario: What if a state 
abolished civil marriage? In fact, a number of prominent theorists from across the 
political spectrum—from Judith Butler and Martha Fineman to Cass Sunstein and 
David Boaz—have suggested the state should “abolish marriage” as a legal 
category.5 They do not merely want to replace the title “marriage” with a less 
controversial name like “civil unions.” They want the state to stop licensing 
relationships. Individuals may adopt whatever social, religious, or moral 
relationships they prefer, but the terms of those relationships would be legally 
enforceable only in tort, contract, or equity. These proposals to abolish marriage 
appeal to several shared arguments: the state has no legitimate reason to define the 
terms of intimate relationships, marriage law is an ineffective means to protect 
children and caregivers, and favoring marriages discriminates against cohabitants 
and single people.6 
The proposal to abolish legal marriage is politically infeasible, at least in the 
United States. Nevertheless, the idea is instructive. It offers a unique way to 
investigate the state’s interest in regulating intimacy. In this Article, I try to reimagine 
our legal world without predefined categories of legal status, and I draw three 
conclusions from this exercise. First, the law cannot avoid status-based norms, even 
if it abolished licensed status categories. Second, the law cannot avoid status because 
intimate relationships involve imperfect duties. Finally, marital status provides a 
reasonable scheme of legal protection for imperfect rights in intimate relationships. 
The first, and most direct, lesson of trying to imagine a world without marriage is 
that the state cannot abolish intimacy status. As long as intimates have enforceable 
rights in private law, as proponents of abolishing marriage assume they will, these 
rights will be tailored to the nature of their relationships. Core principles of contract, 
tort, or equity require the state to examine the parties’ relationship and impose 
judgments about appropriate duties for that category of relationship. Intimate 
relationships are just one among many classes of relationships that alter our 
                                                                                                                 
 
woman,” 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), violated “due process and equal protection principles,” Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. at 2693, because that Act had “the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure” a 
class of same-sex couples “whom [New York], by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity,” id. at 2696. This focus on animus avoided harder questions about 
why New York or the federal government are dignifying certain relationships and what bases 
governments may use to select which relationships to dignify. The evasion was short-lived, 
however. Now that the Court has granted certiorari for an appeal regarding state bans on 
same-sex marriage, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 1039, it will have to decide whether the sex of the 
couple is relevant for some legitimate interest served by state marriage law. 
 4. I use “intimate” to refer to any adult relationship that is personal, long term, and wide 
ranging, which includes but is not limited to sexual relationships. 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. See infra Part I.C. 
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private-law rights. The state could exempt intimates from these doctrines (or private 
law generally), but that exemption would also be a systemic status-based distinction. 
In short, abolishing legal marriage does not get the state out of the marriage business. 
Second, the reason why the state cannot avoid status categories is that many 
intimate norms are what moral philosophers call “imperfect duties.” 7 When private 
law enforces these imperfect intimate rights, public officials will inevitably vacillate 
between discerning the terms of parties’ relationships and imposing normative 
judgments on couples. This tension is inevitable because many intimate duties are 
imperfect. A duty is imperfect when there are many permissible ways or occasions 
to fulfill it, leaving agents discretion to choose how and when to act. This discretion 
is limited by a requirement that the agent remain subjectively committed to fulfilling 
the duty. Legal judgments, however, require determinate rights to form the basis of 
damages or injunctive awards. Judges and juries cannot simply discern and enforce 
imperfect duties, which remain indeterminate until settled by the parties’ own 
discretionary choices. The only way for the law to enforce imperfect intimate duties 
is by displacing spouses’ discretion and commitment. 
Legal marriage—or some similar legal status—offers one way to manage this 
tension. Under current marriage law, spouses cannot sue one another to enforce 
marital rights during the relationship.8 I call this the “intact-marriage rule.” A core 
feature of my argument for marital status, and a central contribution of this Article, 
is a limited defense of the intact-marriage rule. By withholding enforcement during 
marriage, the law avoids supplanting spouses’ discretion and commitment, enabling 
spouses to maintain a legal relationship defined by imperfect duties. Yet marital 
status does not eliminate protection of spouses’ imperfect rights; it simply defers that 
protection. Once spouses separate, they abandon their commitment and discretion, 
so the state can worry less about interfering with their ability to define their 
relationship and express their commitment. 
Having deferred protection during marriage, what dissolution norms should the 
state use? The rationale for deferring protection also defines the basic contours of a 
divorce regime. It would be inappropriate to try to discern precise terms to enforce 
at divorce, since the law withholds enforcement so that spouses can maintain their 
indeterminate duties. Instead, the state assumes that intimates sustained their 
relationship because it was mutually beneficial, which justifies egalitarian default 
rules. However, couples may exercise their discretion to adopt clear expectations—in 
which case those expectations deserve protection, a goal that can only be effectuated 
with equitable discretion. In short, by combining deferred protection with egalitarian 
and equitable dissolution norms, marital status creates a framework of imperfect legal 
rights, something many political philosophers have rejected as impossible.9 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. For a full definition of imperfect duties, see infra Part III.A. Despite the nomenclature, 
imperfect duties are not deficient. An imperfect duty can be more important and stringent than 
a perfect duty, which admits only one manner of performance. 
 8. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); see also infra notes 34–
41 and accompanying text. 
 9. Kant and Mill, for example, argued that the law cannot or should recognize imperfect 
legal rights or duties. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS Ak. 6:384–88 (1797), 
reprinted in IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353, 516–20 (Mary J. Gregor ed. 
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 61 (Batoche 
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The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the current regulation of 
intimate relationships and describes the proposals for abolishing marriage. Part II 
argues that even if the state abolishes marriage, core doctrines in tort, contract, and 
equity would still require status-based norms. Part III argues that the state inevitably 
relies on status norms because intimate relationships are characterized by imperfect 
duties and also describes the difficulties this reliance poses for legal enforcement. 
Part IV offers a limited defense of legal marriage, arguing that its combination of 
deferred protection and equitable dissolution is a reasonable way to create imperfect 
legal duties. 
At the outset, I should make several limits of the Article clear. First, I do not 
engage directly in the same-sex marriage debate. The rationale that I articulate for 
marital status does not differentiate between same- and opposite-sex couples. 
However, that rationale is only one reason for marital status; other reasons might 
apply differently to same-sex relationships. Second, this Article is not a full defense 
of contemporary marriage law. This Article focuses on the regulation of rights 
between intimates. Marriage law does much more. It structures couples’ relationships 
to third parties, creating default rights such as the power to make medical decisions.10 
It affects spouses’ entitlements to public benefits, such as family leave or social 
security. The state also extols marriage and uses marriage’s social value to 
discriminate against unmarried persons. These aspects of family law raise 
fundamental questions of distributive justice that I do not address here. If the state 
has no legitimate reason to regulate personal relationships, this problem is distinct 
from the expressive or distributional effects of marriage. Last, this Article does not 
address the relationship between marriage and children. A full account of 
relationship law must address the interaction between caregiver and relationship 
status. Nevertheless, the two may be considered separately.11 Many intimate partners 
have no children, and many children are not raised by intimate partners. This Article 
addresses only whether the state has a direct interest in regulating adult intimate 
relationships according to the couple’s status and, in particular, regulating these 
relationships through a status like marriage. 
I. CURRENT LAW OF RELATIONSHIP REGULATION 
Before trying to envision a world without status categories, it is important to see 
the breadth of existing relationship regulations. Current law regulates relationships, 
both licensed and unlicensed. This Part offers a birds-eye view of the legal regulation 
of relationships and then moves on to describe proposals to abolish these 
intimate-status rules. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Books 2001) (1863). 
 10. See Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1783 (2005). 
 11. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and 
Co-Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197 (2012). 
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A. Licensed Relationships 
The range of relationship licenses has ballooned in the last twenty years, and the 
pace of change is rapid.12 Marriage remains the paradigmatic status and the only 
status recognized in all American states, but many states now offer alternatives, 
including civil unions, reciprocal beneficiaries, and domestic partnerships. This 
subpart describes the current regime of licensed relationships in the United States.13 
At the outset, it is important to note that these statuses are exclusive: a couple can 
maintain only one status, and a person can maintain a status relationship with only 
one person at a time.14 
1. Marriage 
Despite its much-heralded decline, marriage retains vast popular appeal. A 2001 
study predicted that almost 90% of American women would marry during their 
lifetimes.15 Between 40% and 50% of American marriages end in divorce, but this 
implies that 50% to 60% last until death.16 This section recounts the default rules 
governing marital relationships. Marriage law has legal phases. The state (1) polices 
entry into marriage; (2) provides benefits during marriage, but refuses to enforce 
marital rights; and (3) imposes equitable dissolution norms when the marriage ends. 
In later sections, I will argue that there are legitimate reasons to retain a status with 
this general structure. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of 
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1883–86 (2012). 
 13. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER 
OR FOR WORSE? WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 252–57 (2006) (describing 
alternative categorization). 
 14. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-104 (West Supp. 2014) (exclusivity); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-111(3) (West Supp. 2014) (automatic termination); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 572B-2 (West Supp. 2013) (exclusivity); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.7 (West Supp. 2013) 
(automatic termination). Exceptions exist when a state with new laws wants to avoid disrupting 
settled expectations. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, STATE N.J. DEP’T HEALTH, 
http://www.nj.gov/health/vital/faq.shtml#ssm (last modified Nov. 14, 2014) (same-sex couples 
in civil unions or domestic partnerships may marry and retain their prior status). 
 15. Joshua R. Goldstein & Catherine T. Kenney, Marriage Delayed or Marriage 
Forgone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S. Women, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 506, 
506–07 (2001). 
 16. See Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of 
Research in the 2000s, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 403, 404–05 (2010). These numbers hide 
increasing differences in marriage rates across racial, income, and educational divides, with 
non-Hispanic white and college-educated women being more likely to marry and less likely 
to divorce. See id. See generally Linda C. McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 
93 B.U. L. REV. 921 (2013); Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring 
Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607 (2004). 
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a. Entering Marriage 
In most states, to be legally married, a couple must obtain a license and exchange 
vows before a licensed officiate. The state uses registration to ensure that fiancés are 
competent to accept marital obligations (of sufficient age, able to consent); to impose 
limits on who may marry (two persons who are unmarried, not close relatives, and 
of the opposite sex); and to keep track of who is entitled to marriage’s benefits and 
burdens. Eleven states and the District of Columbia still recognize common-law 
marriages.17 A common-law marriage exists if the spouses have the capacity to 
marry, have a present and mutual intent to marry, cohabitate for a significant amount 
of time, and hold themselves out to the community as married.18 Common-law 
spouses have the same rights and obligations as registered spouses.19 
Most couples simply obtain a license and exchange vows. This means the terms 
of their marriage are set by default rules in marriage statutes, which I discuss below. 
However, a small minority of spouses enter premarital contracts. Most marriage rules 
regarding property and support are now soft default rules that parties may alter 
contractually, at least before marriage. Premarital agreements about property and 
support at divorce are enforceable, subject to a few mandatory rules and fairness 
limits.20 For example, the parties cannot alter the grounds for divorce;21 additionally, 
judges may review contracts for procedural defects, such as undue pressure or failure 
to disclose assets, and for substantive unfairness at the time of execution or (in a 
minority of states) at the time of divorce.22 Unlike agreements made before marriage, 
“marital agreements” between spouses in an intact marriage are viewed with 
suspicion.23 A few states enforce marital agreements under the same rules as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law Marriage, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL 
L. 151, 151 (2009) (listing current authorities). Inertia likely kept common-law marriage on 
the books, but Cynthia Bowman has argued that it should be more actively used to protect 
women who adopt vulnerable traditional roles. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal 
To Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 754–70 (1996). 
 18. See Thomas, supra note 17, at 157–60.  
 19. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 43 (2011). Common-law spouses occupy a space between 
licensed marriages and cohabitation. Unlike cohabitants, they must intend and hold themselves 
out as married. However, the state plays no role at entry and less of a role during marriage, 
because spouses typically seek legal recognition only in divorce petitions, in probate after one 
spouse’s death, or if one spouse wants to assert an evidentiary privilege. 
 20. See Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and 
Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 318–24 (2012) (describing modern law regarding 
enforcement of premarital agreements). 
 21. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UPMAA) § 10(b)(3) (2012). 
 22. The model codes, commentators, and statutes provide for differing procedural and 
substantive review, with significant disputes about the extent of disclosure required and the 
extent of ex ante or ex post fairness review. See Atwood & Bix, supra note 20, at 318–24, 330, 
332–33, 339–44 (comparing procedural and substantive standards used by the Uniform 
Premarital Agreements Act (UPAA) section 6; the uniform acts as adopted; the American Law 
Institute (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution sections 7.04–.05; and the 
UPMAA section 9). 
 23. See id. at 324–28 (describing “unsettled and evolving” law regarding marital 
agreements). 
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premarital agreements,24 but others impose stricter procedural requirements and 
more searching fairness review.25 
b. During Marriage 
During marriage, the state engages in a curious blend of intervention and 
nonintervention. On the one hand, married couples receive numerous legal benefits. 
The benefits can be categorized in various ways, but I find the “rough[] taxonom[y]” 
offered by Elizabeth Brake useful.26 First, the state conditions monetary benefits (and 
some burdens) on marital status. For instance, married couples receive a special tax 
status and social security benefits.27 Other laws “facilitate day-to-day maintenance 
of a relationship,” providing for sick leave, emergency decision-making powers, or 
immigration benefits.28 This category also includes the default rules for assigning 
title and control over property during marriage.29 Last, the law provides special 
protection for the widowed, through pension benefits, precedence in intestacy, and 
the right to bring wrongful-death claims.30 All of these benefits, of course, affect 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See id. at 327–28 nn.85–88 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -155 (2011); Stoner 
v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529 (Pa. 2003)). 
 25. Id. at 324 n.67 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 1620 (West 2004 & Supp. 2012); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 40-2-303 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-8 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 205 
(2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-2-13 (2012)); see also Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 26–
29 (Conn. 2011). 
 26. Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage 
Law, 120 ETHICS 302, 306–07 (2010). For an alternative grouping, see Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2090–92 (2005). For an impressive list, see 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–56 (Mass. 2003). 
 27. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (listing healthcare 
benefits, bankruptcy protections, and joint tax requirements). The Windsor plaintiff’s 
complaint concerned the spousal exemption from the estate tax, 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a). 
 28. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2012) (requiring employers to grant employees 
medical leave to care for their spouses, children, or parents); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d 
(McKinney 2012) (assigning spouse or domestic partner as the primary default decision maker 
for an incapacitated person, aside from those assigned a guardian for mental-health reasons); 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a (Supp. 2014) (authorizing conditional permanent-resident status for 
spouses). See generally Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1634–38 (2007) (discussing myriad ways that immigration law privileges 
spouses and fiancés and defines who qualifies for these favored statuses). 
 29.  In the forty-one states that follow the title scheme, each spouse has decision-making 
authority over any property to which he or she holds title; in the nine states that follow 
community-property principles, each spouse holds an undivided one-half interest in all 
property acquired during marriage (except gifts or inheritances to one spouse, or profits from 
such separate property) and so has sole decision-making authority over most transactions. See 
Elizabeth De Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of 
Community Property Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 261–67 (1994–95); Carolyn J. Frantz 
& Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 124–25 (2004). 
 30. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2012) (preference for 
spouse in distribution of residual estate under intestacy); Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of 
N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that New York statute authorizing 
wrongful-death claim for “surviving spouse” did not include surviving partner of same-sex 
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spouses’ incentives for marital behavior. For instance, federal tax law reinforces the 
breadwinner marriage by rewarding couples with unequal salaries.31 In addition, as 
Kerry Abrams has documented, the law sometimes expressly requires intimates to 
structure their lives in particular ways.32 Immigration authorities, for instance, have 
adopted intrusive tests to decide whether a formally valid marriage is “fraudulent”; 
to pass these tests, couples must prove that they fulfill stereotypical marital roles.33 
On the other hand, American law takes a hands-off approach to spouses’ duties 
with respect to one another. Spouses cannot enforce marital rights during their 
marriage. This limit applies to marital rights arising from status or agreement. 
Spouses may sue one another in tort and can be subject to criminal liability,34 but 
they cannot sue to enforce “marital rights.” The classic cases held that a spouse could 
not bring an action for financial support until the couple separated.35 Some 
jurisdictions permit spouses to seek support if necessary to avoid “neglect.”36 In 
addition, courts will not enforce agreements about behavior during the marriage, 
such as agreements about sexual expectations, familial living arrangements, 
domestic services, or religious practices.37 This rule applies during marriage and at 
                                                                                                                 
 
civil union). 
 31. Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax Treatments of 
Marriage at Different Income Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 783, 795–800 (2015). 
 32. See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14–38 (2012). 
 33. Id. at 30–37. 
 34. Until recently, the coverture fiction of spousal unity precluded spouses from suing 
one another in tort at all. See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. 
REV. 359, 363–66 (1989). These doctrines have been abolished or abrogated to specific causes 
of action in all but a minority of states. Id. at 359, 435–41. All states have eliminated the 
marital rape exemption, Jennifer McMahon-Howard, Jody Clay-Warner & Linda Renzulli, 
Criminalizing Spousal Rape: The Diffusion of Legal Reforms, 52 SOC. PERSP. 505, 513 tbl.1 
(2009), although a majority still “criminalize a narrower range of [sexual] offenses if 
committed within marriage, subject the marital rape they do recognize to less serious 
sanctions, and/or create special procedural hurdles for marital rape prosecutions.” Jill Elaine 
Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1375 
(2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 35. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); Smith v. Smith, 92 
N.E.2d 418, 418–19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); Commonwealth v. George, 56 A.2d 228, 230–31 
(Pa. 1948). One unpublished California case concluded that marital support obligations are 
enforceable during marriage even if the spouse is not destitute, but on special facts: the plaintiff 
sued her legally incompetent husband through her stepson, who was acting trustee of her 
husband’s estate. Weissberg v. Weissberg, No. A132161, 2013 WL 1276119 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 28, 2013). 
 36. See Commonwealth ex rel. DiPadova v. DiPadova, 302 A.2d 510, 511 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1973). 
 37. See Mary Ann Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 225, 226–27 (2011); Jonathan E. Fields, Forbidden Provisions in Prenuptial 
Agreements: Legal and Practical Considerations for the Matrimonial Lawyer, 21 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL L. 413, 428–33 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: 
Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2197 n.248 (1994) 
(collecting cases); Laura P. Graham, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and 
Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing 
Marriage, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1043–49 (1993) (collecting cases). The Uniform Law 
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divorce. The most striking limit in this respect is that some states will not enforce 
contracts between spouses for domestic services.38 The traditional rationale for this 
rule is that spouses already have a mutual obligation of support, so a promise of 
support is insufficient consideration.39 Other states, however, permit spouses to 
recover for services if they have an express contract.40 As a rule, however, spouses 
cannot enforce marital rights while their marriage is intact. I will call this the 
“intact-marriage rule.”41 
c. Separation and Divorce 
Separation marks a categorical divide. After a couple separates, a dependent 
spouse may become entitled to seek alimony or maintenance.42 Separation lacks a 
                                                                                                                 
 
Commission’s UPAA, passed in 1983 and adopted by twenty-six states, indicates that couples 
may contract about “any . . . matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in 
violation of public policy.” UPAA § 3(a)(8) (1983). Nevertheless, I have found no cases 
supporting the implications of section 3 that (1) premarital or marital agreements are enforceable 
during marriage or (2) premarital or marital agreements regarding ordinary life are enforceable. 
In the 2012 revision of the UPMAA, the drafters chose not to “expressly deal” with provisions 
regarding “obligations inter se.” Atwood & Bix, supra note 20, at 344. 
 38. See, e.g., Mays v. Wadel, 236 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind. App. 1968) (refusing to enforce 
husband’s promise to pay for death-bed nursing services); Hughes v. Lord (In re Estate of 
Lord), 602 P.2d 1030, 1031 (N.M. 1979) (refusing to enforce wife’s promise to devise her 
estate to husband if he married her and cared for her during her illness); Kuder v. Schroeder, 
430 S.E.2d 271, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce husband’s promise to support 
all of the family’s financial needs once he completed his master’s and law degrees if wife 
would forego her career to work as a teacher during his schooling). 
 39. See, e.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 17–20 (Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to 
enforce husband’s promise to bequeath wife a portion of his separate property if she cared for 
him in their home rather than send him to nursing home). The argument that a promise of 
support is insufficient consideration has been justly criticized. See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, 
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 30–33 (1996). 
 40. See, e.g., Dade v. Anderson, 439 S.E.2d 353, 355 (Va. 1994). 
 41. Saul Levmore calls it a “love-it-or-leave-it rule,” but I think this term places undue 
emphasis on the remedy. Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 
225–26 (1995). 
 42. The common law permitted a wife to bring an action in equity for maintenance if 
the couple were separated and she was not at fault, which meant that the husband either 
abandoned her or drove her away through extreme cruelty. See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND 
WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 6–11, 20–21 (2000) (discussing McGuire v. McGuire, 59 
N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); Cochran v. Cochran, 60 N.W. 942 (Neb. 1894); Earle v. Earle, 43 
N.W. 118 (Neb. 1889)). Some states still recognize an action in equity for maintenance 
without divorce. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (2014); Womack v. Womack, 449 
S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ark. 1970) (citing Wood v. Wood, 15 S.W. 459 (Ark. 1891)); Honea v. 
Honea, 2003-CA-02410-COA (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); McWilliams v. McWilliams, 537 
A.2d 35, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); In re Marriage of Gannon, 702 P.2d 465, 466 (Wash. 
1985). Other states make a pending petition for legal separation or divorce the precondition 
for temporary maintenance (often called pendente lite, or “awaiting the litigation”). See, 
e.g., Dick v. Dick (In re Marriage of Dick), 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 755 (Ct. App. 1993) 
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precise legal definition, but it is typically synonymous with ending the relationship 
or breaking up.43 Spouses may be separated yet living in the same house, as long as 
they do not share personal or social activities.44 
All American jurisdictions have no-fault divorce statutes, which allow spouses to 
divorce if their marriage is irretrievably broken because of “irreconcilable 
differences.”45 Spouses may be required to wait for a statutory period ranging from 
six months to two years, which is lengthened if one spouse refuses consent.46 Most 
courts do not question one spouse’s claim that the couple has “irreconcilable 
differences.”47 Some states also retain “fault” grounds for divorce, including 
adultery, desertion, mental or physical cruelty, drunkenness, and nonsupport, 
although the primary difference is to shorten the waiting period.48 
All of the states use loosely egalitarian default rules to divide marital property and 
to give dependent spouses limited support.49 A vast majority of states divide all 
property obtained during the marriage “equitably.”50 Family-court judges must 
                                                                                                                 
 
(discussing statutory provisions now found at sections 3600 and 3653 of the California 
Family Code); Galvin v. Galvin, 378 N.E.2d 510, 513 (Ill. 1978). 
 43. Historically, separation had a much more contested and varied meaning, because 
spouses often lacked the legal right or financial means to obtain a divorce, and “separated” 
wives in particular suffered under coverture doctrines that granted them rights only through 
their husbands. See HARTOG, supra note 42, at 38–39 (summarizing historical rights of 
separated spouses). 
 44. See, e.g., Mackey v. Mackey, 545 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that 
spouses were separated, though residing in the same home and sharing public areas, because 
they maintained private living quarters, no longer maintained “public social life,” and 
“[s]ignificantly, the parties stipulate[d] that they ha[d] not engaged in sexual relations” in three 
years). Contra Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 710 S.E.2d 431, 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding that action for separate maintenance requires living in separate domiciles); Theisen 
v. Theisen, 716 S.E.2d 271, 276 (S.C. 2011) (same). 
 45. For a history of divorce reform, see generally Herman Hill Kay, From the Second Sex 
to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States 
During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017 (2000); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault 
Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 82–91. 
 46. See generally Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statute Providing a 
“Cooling Off Period” or Lapse of Time Prior to Filing of Complaint, Hearing, or Entry of 
Decree in Divorce Suit, 62 A.L.R.2D 1262, 1262–65 (1958) (describing state statutes requiring 
waiting periods). 
 47. JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE 
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 176–80 (2011). 
 48. Id. at 161–68. Although these are often listed as the traditional fault grounds, divorce 
was largely unavailable until the mid-eighteenth century, and adultery was the primary ground 
for divorce until the early twentieth century. HARTOG, supra note 42, at 26–28, 64–73. 
 49. Many argue that divorce norms are insufficiently egalitarian. See generally MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE 
REFORM (1991) (arguing that divorce rhetoric supports formal equality over equality of outcomes). 
 50. Three community-property states divide all marital property equally and leave 
separate property with the title holder, while a few common-law states divide all of the 
couple’s property equitably regardless of its characterization as marital or separate. PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.09 Reporter’s 
Notes cmt. b (2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
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decide what division is fair based on numerous factors that attempt to value each 
spouse’s relative need and his or her contribution to the marriage and to marital 
property.51 Equitable divorce does not balance a couple’s relationship ledger. Courts 
consider each spouse’s contribution, but primarily to offset financial imbalances 
rather than to compensate spouses for their contributions.52 Some equitable 
distribution states also have a presumption that marital property will be divided 
equally or that equal division will be the “starting point[]” for analysis.53 Empirical 
analysis of divorce outcomes suggests that judges applying equitable distribution 
rules tend to converge on equal division as a general norm.54 
Divorce courts also have the power to award alimony, though alimony awards 
are rare.55 Alimony is no longer regarded as compensation for a promise of lifelong 
support, but no dominant alternative theory has emerged.56 Many states follow a 
rehabilitative approach that awards only temporary alimony to help dependent 
spouses regain financial self-sufficiency.57 Some states, however, use alimony to 
help spouses retain their marital standard of living. States may regard alimony as 
compensation for one spouse’s foregone career opportunities, as a fair return on 
her contribution to the marriage, or as restitution for contributions to the spouses’ 
future earning potential.58 Unlike property divisions that take effect upon entry of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Id. § 4.09 cmt. a. 
 52. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982) (“Marriage is not a business 
arrangement in which the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled 
upon divorce.”). 
 53. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 29, at 100–01 (identifying twelve states with a statutory 
presumption, four with a starting point, and three that require equal division). The ALI adopted 
a presumption of equal division. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 50, § 4.09. 
 54. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis 
of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 407–08, 452, 507 (1996) (study of 
judicial decisions and settlement outcomes in New York from 1980–90). 
 55. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s 
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 697 tbl.36 (1991) 
(finding that alimony was awarded in twelve percent of New York cases in 1984); Judith G. 
McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study of Divorce 
Cases, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 75 (2010) (alimony awarded in 8.6% of divorces in one 
county in Wisconsin). In 2012, only 385,000 Americans received alimony, yet, in 2011 alone, 
over 2.3 million Americans divorced. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SOURCE OF INCOME IN 
2012—PEOPLE 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY INCOME OF SPECIFIED TYPE IN 2012 (2013), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032013/perinc/pinc08_000.htm, with 
Divorces in the Last Year by Sex by Marital Status for the Population 15 Years and Over, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/12_5YR/B12503. 
 56. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L.Q. 271 (2011) (surveying 
theories of alimony); see also Carol Rogerson, The Canadian Law of Spousal Support, 38 
FAM. L.Q. 69, 73–95 (2004). 
 57. Mary Frances Lyle & Jeffrey L. Levy, From Riches to Rags: Does Rehabilitative 
Alimony Need To Be Rehabilitated?, 38 FAM. L.Q. 3, 10–12 (2004). This approach was 
adopted in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act section 308, which influenced alimony 
reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. See id. at 8–10. A handful of states award alimony only if a 
spouse cannot meet her basic needs through employment or if the spouse has a physical or 
mental disability. Id. at 15–16. 
 58. See Starnes, supra note 56, at 280–87. It is controversial whether future earning 
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judgment, alimony rights may be adjusted if the parties’ financial positions 
change, such as when the payer loses a job or the payee remarries.59 As a result, 
many argue that property division is a legal entitlement, while alimony is a form 
of privatized welfare.60 
The states are split about whether marital misbehavior is relevant to property 
division or alimony. Sixteen states do not take account of marital misconduct (such 
as adultery or emotional abuse), because those states believe that adjudicating these 
disputes intrudes on marital privacy and wastes judicial resources on matters 
irrelevant to disentangling the spouses’ lives.61 On the other hand, fifteen states 
permit courts to adjust the property division if one spouse’s behavior burdened the 
marriage or contributed to its breakup.62 The property division may reflect “spousal 
abuse; child abuse; adultery; desertion; cruelty; nonsupport; failure to cooperate in 
the divorce case; attempted murder; fraudulent inducement to marry; and assorted 
other actions.”63 Some states consider only egregious conduct, which includes 
repeated physical abuse, attempted murder, child abuse, or refusal to grant a 
religious divorce, but not “adultery, verbal abuse, or false statements with no clear 
economic effect on the marriage.”64 
2. Civil Unions and Strong Domestic Partnerships 
Eight states maintain a status with rights that are equivalent to marriage, but 
under a different name—either civil unions or domestic partnerships.65 For 
simplicity, I will call these relationships “civil unions.” Civil unions carry the 
                                                                                                                 
 
capacity should be a factor in determining an alimony award, an asset subject to equitable 
division, a factor in the equitable division, or should not be considered at all. See Frantz 
& Dagan, supra note 29, at 107–12; William M. Howard, Annotation, Spouse’s Professional 
Degree or License as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Property 
Settlement, 3 A.L.R.6TH 447, 466–71 (2005). 
 59. MARIAN DOBBS, DETERMINING CHILD & SPOUSAL SUPPORT §§ 6:6, 6:25 (2014). 
 60. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 29, at 105–06. 
 61. 2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 8:24 (3d ed. 2005 
& Supp. 2013–14); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Fault as Consideration in Alimony, 
Spousal Support, or Property Division Awards Pursuant to No-Fault Divorce, 86 A.L.R.3D 
1116, 1124–29 (1978). 
 62. 2 TURNER, supra note 61, § 8:24 (Alabama, Connecticut, Michigan, Mississippi,  
Missouri, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands); J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 13.02[1][a] (2006) (citing, in addition, Idaho and New 
Hampshire); Karnezis, supra note 61, at 1117, 1129–35. 
 63. 2 TURNER, supra note 61, § 8:26 (footnotes omitted). 
 64. Id. § 8:25 (identifying Kansas, North Dakota, and New York). 
 65. Hawaii, Illinois, and New Jersey recognize civil unions. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572B-1 
to -11 (West Supp. 2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 75/1 to /90 (West Supp. 2014); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 to -36 (West Supp. 2014). California, the District of Columbia, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington recognize domestic partnerships. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–
299.6 (West Supp. 2014); D.C. CODE §§ 32-701 to -710 (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 122A.010–.510 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300–.340 
(2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.60.010–.901 (West Supp. 2014). 
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same rights, obligations, benefits, and burdens of marriage—including access to 
public benefits and the divorce regime. Some states impose additional criteria on 
applicants to prove their interdependence, such as sharing a “common 
residence.”66 
It is unclear whether civil unions represent a true alternative to marriage or 
are simply a transitional stage to equality for same-sex couples.67 Four states 
limit civil unions to same-sex couples,68 and two more limit these unions to same-
sex couples or opposite-sex couples where at least one partner is over the age of 
sixty-two.69 Only four jurisdictions permit same- and opposite-sex couples alike 
to enter civil unions.70 Several states eliminated civil unions when they started 
recognizing same-sex marriages,71 while others retained a civil-union registry.72 
Why would a couple prefer a civil union if marriage is available? Civil unions 
may appeal to those who want to avoid marriage’s connotations: its religious 
implications, its historical association with oppression of women and racial and 
sexual minorities, or its social signaling effects that can channel couples into 
traditional marital roles. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A.100(2)(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.030(1). 
 67. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil Unions 
Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 147 (2000). 
Contra WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF 
GAY RIGHTS 121 (2002) (describing new forms of relationships in Europe as “sedimentary” 
because the new form is placed on top of the old, rather than replacing it). As of February 
2015, same-sex couples may marry in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia, and six 
states have marriage court rulings pending further action. States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated Feb. 6, 2015) (offering up-to-date 
information on the recognition of same-sex unions). 
 68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 202(3) (Supp. 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29; OR. REV. 
STAT. § 106.310(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-1(2) (2013). 
 69. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(4); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.030(2). 
 70. D.C. CODE § 32-701; HAW. REV. STAT. § 572B-2; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 75/10; 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A.100(2). Washington opened domestic partnerships to 
opposite-sex couples over sixty-two years of age. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.030. 
 71. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38rr (West Supp. 2015) (civil unions 
automatically converted to marriages after specified date); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 218 
(Supp. 2014) (no civil unions issued after July 1, 2013, and all civil unions automatically 
converted to marriages on July 1, 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1–8 (Supp. 2014) 
(repealed civil-union statute); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-3, -4 (2013) (provisions governing new 
civil-union licenses, repealed by Act of May 2, 2013, ch. 4, § 6); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§§ 5160–5165 (2012) (same). 
 72. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.7 (West Supp. 2013) (specifying rights for parties to 
marriages, civil unions, and reciprocal-beneficiary relationships); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.60.030 (amended by Act of Feb. 13, 2012, ch. 3, § 9, 2011–12 Wash. Sess. Laws 199, 
203, to eliminate same-sex domestic partnerships but retain domestic partnerships if one party 
is over age sixty-two); Hawaii Electronic Marriage and Civil Union Registration System, 
STATE HAW. DEP’T HEALTH, https://emrs.ehawaii.gov/emrs/public/home.html; see also 
Frequently Asked Questions, STATE N.J. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.nj.gov/health/vital
/faq.shtml#ssm. 
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3. Registered Beneficiaries and Intermediate Domestic Partnerships 
Five states have reciprocal-beneficiary or limited domestic-partnership laws.73 
Reciprocal beneficiaries do not receive property or support rights but do receive a set 
of reciprocal rights useful for people in intimate relationships.74 They may receive 
inheritance rights, surrogate decision-making rights, hospital visitation rights, the 
right to sue for wrongful death, employment benefits, or the right to hold property as 
tenants by the entirety.75 
Reciprocal-beneficiary status is easier to enter and exit than marriage, but the 
substantive limits on entry can be more onerous. To create a relationship, individuals 
need only fill out a form alleging that they are not in another recognized relationship 
and agreeing to assume the listed rights.76 Colorado even supplies a model form that 
requires each party to initial the specific rights they intend to adopt or withhold.77 
Exiting the relationship is even easier. Either party may terminate the relationship 
unilaterally by filing a notice, which is effective immediately.78 The beneficiary 
status can also terminate automatically if one of the beneficiaries enters another 
marriage or civil union.79 Despite the ease of entry and exit, some states restrict 
reciprocal-beneficiary status to long-term cohabitants who are committed to mutual 
support.80 Maryland even requires applicants to present two documents proving their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-106 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 
(West Supp. 2013) (limiting reciprocal-beneficiary relationship to individuals prohibited from 
marrying—a prohibition which now applies only to family members covered by the incest 
prohibition); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2013); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101 (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 770.01 (West 2009). 
 74. Eskridge calls these “unitive rules,” which are rules that “enforce or reflect the 
assumption that a married couple operate as a unit or a team, whose interdependence should 
be respected by the government.” Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1910. 
 75. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-106; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4; Act 
effective July 30, 2004, ch. 672, 2003 Me. Laws 2126 (altering various code provisions to give 
domestic partners rights equivalent to spouses for inheritance, guardianship and protection 
from domestic abuse). Wisconsin gives domestic partners a variety of benefits but marriage’s 
property division rules. Howard A. Sweet, Understanding Domestic Partnerships in 
Wisconsin, WIS. LAW., Nov. 2009, at 6, 56. Notably, for the first three rights (inheritance, 
surrogate decision making, and visitation), parties have the power to designate the rights 
holder, but for the last three rights (wrongful death actions, employment benefits, and tenancy 
by the entirety), the law continues to specify the categories of possible rights holders. 
 76. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-5 (West 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 2710(3). 
 77. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-22-104 to -106 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013) (model 
contract). 
 78. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-22-104, -111(3) (West Supp. 2013); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 572C-7(a) (West Supp. 2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710(4) (also 
requires service in hand to the other partner). 
 79. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-7(c). 
 80. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710(2) (applicants must be “domiciled 
together under long-term arrangements that evidence a commitment to remain responsible 
indefinitely for each other’s welfare”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101(a)(4) 
(LexisNexis 2009) (applicants must “[a]gree to be in a relationship of mutual interdependence 
in which each individual contributes to the maintenance and support of the other individual 
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interdependence, such as a mortgage, relationship contract, joint account, power of 
attorney, insurance policy, or will.81 
4. Limited Domestic-Partnership Registries 
Numerous cities and counties in twenty-five states maintain domestic-partnership 
registries.82 LGBT advocates convinced municipalities to enact the first registries in 
the 1980s, when state-level recognition was politically infeasible. Many cities also 
permit opposite-sex couples to register as domestic partners.83 Domestic partnership 
registries cannot give the parties property or support rights, which are governed by 
state law, but many give partners hospital visitation rights and, for employees of the 
municipality or its contractors, employment benefits. Domestic partners may also 
receive surrogate decision-making rights.84 
B. Unlicensed Cohabiting Relationships 
Even couples who do not enter licensed relationships may have enforceable 
obligations. Despite the increasing prevalence of cohabitation—over eight million 
couples lived together without marrying in 2013, up from less than five million in 
2000 and half a million in 196085—the states have not developed a consistent 
regulatory scheme. Drawing on work by Ann Estin and Marsha Garrison, this subpart 
surveys the spectrum of legal regimes regulating cohabiting couples.86 On one end, 
Georgia and Illinois deny cohabitants any legal remedies, even refusing to enforce 
                                                                                                                 
 
and the relationship, even if both individuals are not required to contribute equally to the 
relationship”). 
 81. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101(b)(2). 
 82. The Human Rights Campaign maintains an updated list of domestic-partner registries. 
City and County Domestic Partner Registries, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org
/resources/entry/city-and-county-domestic-partner-registries. 
 83. See, e.g., ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. IX, ch. 110 (2013); ST. LOUIS, 
MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8.37.050 (1994) (providing hospital and jail visitation privileges). 
 84. For example, New York recognizes domestic partners for purposes of surrogate 
decision making, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965 (McKinney 2012); hospital visitation, N.Y. 
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-q (McKinney 2012); workers’ compensation and death benefits, 
N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 4 (McKinney 2013); death in a terrorist attack, N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-4.7(e)(2)–(3) (McKinney 2008); and conflict-of-interest 
analysis, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 811 (McKinney 2008). 
 85. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE UC1, OPPOSITE SEX UNMARRIED COUPLES BY 
LABOR FORCE STATUS OF BOTH PARTNERS (2013), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes
/families/files/cps2013/tabUC1-all.xls, with  Pamela J. Smock & Wendy D. Manning, Living 
Together Unmarried in the United States: Demographic Perspectives and Implications for 
Family Policy, 26 LAW & POL’Y 87, 89 (2004). 
 86. See Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1401–
08 (2001); Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal 
Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 315–22 (2008); see also J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage 
Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, and the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521 (2011). 
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written relationship contracts.87 On the other end, seven states impose property 
sharing or support obligations for cohabitants.88 The remaining states regulate 
cohabitation using private-law remedies.89 The states that permit cohabitants to 
enforce the terms of their relationship do so through (1) express and implied-in-fact 
contracts; (2) implied-in law contracts, implied joint ventures, or new status-based 
remedies; and (3) general equitable remedies.90 
I discuss each option below, but to appreciate the legal uncertainty, one needs a 
sense of the variation among cohabiting relationships. Social science research 
suggests that couples cohabitate for numerous reasons that exhibit class and racial 
patterns.91 Students and college-educated women regard cohabitation as a 
convenience or as a testing period for marriage, while less wealthy and educated 
women cohabitate for financial reasons.92 In addition, many women cohabitate 
because they do not view their partners as of marriageable quality. A large percentage 
of cohabitants are wary divorcées.93 African Americans and Hispanics are more 
likely to cohabitate than white non-Hispanics, which Cynthia Bowman attributes to 
income inequality and greater cultural acceptance of consensual unions.94 Of course, 
cohabitants often have different expectations for their relationship, and these 
expectations change over time. Given this laundry list of possible reasons for 
cohabiting, it is unsurprising that cohabitation is less stable than marriage. Half of 
cohabiting relationships in the United States end within five years.95 Even in Europe, 
where cohabitation is more common and has greater social support, a majority of 
cohabiting relationships end in separation or marriage in less than five years.96 In 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 
1211 (Ill. 1979). 
 88. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 89. See, e.g., Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo. 2000); Boland v. 
Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 144–46 (Conn. 1987); In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 
619 (Iowa 2004); Cates v. Swain, 2010-CT-01939-SCT (¶ 21) (Miss. 2013). 
 90. This conceptual map was articulated in an influential 1976 case  before the California 
Supreme Court, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976); see also Marvin v. Marvin, 
5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3077 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1979). Marvin did not generate broad 
experimentation with implied or equitable remedies, see Estin, supra note 86, at 1401–08; 
Garrison, supra note 86, at 315–22, but its articulation of the available options still structures 
the legal imagination. 
 91. See generally Smock & Manning, supra note 85. For a survey of the empirical 
literature, see CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
102–23 (2010). 
 92. BOWMAN, supra note 91, at 103–04, 107–09. 
 93. Id. at 117 (in 51.5% of cohabiting relationships, at least one cohabitant has been 
divorced). 
 94. Id. at 110–17, 135–36. 
 95. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY app. at 206 (2009). In addition, forty-nine percent of cohabiting 
couples will split within five years, compared to twenty percent of first marriages. 
Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the United States, VITAL & HEALTH 
STAT. (CDC, Wash., D.C.), July 2002, at 14, 17, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data
/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf. 
 96. Kathleen Kiernan, Changing European Families: Trends and Issues, in THE 
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contrast, only twenty-three percent of marriages in the United States end within five 
years, and a majority never divorce.97 Given the variation among cohabiting 
relationships and their fragility, legal regulation is challenging, to say the least. 
1. Breach of Contract 
First, all but two American jurisdictions will enforce express cohabitation 
contracts.98 However, these contracts are limited in several ways. Several states limit 
enforcement to express or written contracts, out of the same pragmatic concerns that 
underlie statutes of frauds, such as the ease of false allegations, the lengthiness of 
court battles, and the difficulty of determining precise terms.99 In addition, while 
courts will acknowledge that cohabitants expect a sexual relationship, only promises 
severable from the sexual relationship can be enforced.100 And, as in marital 
agreements, courts may refuse to enforce provisions governing everyday life. Robert 
Ellickson has observed that the commercial firms selling model cohabitation 
agreements advise clients that courts will not enforce clauses relating to “the 
day-to-day details” of their relationship, such as housecleaning, cooking, care of pets, 
or home decoration.101 Nevertheless, California courts have enforced contract claims 
relating to domestic services,102 and a Florida court has enforced a support agreement 
in which the cohabitant promised to “perform housework, yard work, provision[] the 
house, and cook[] for the parties.”103 
                                                                                                                 
 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF FAMILIES 17, 20 (Jacqueline Scott, Judith 
Treas & Martin Richards eds., 2004). 
 97. CHERLIN, supra note 95, app. at 206; see also supra note 16. 
 98. The two jurisdictions that will not enforce express contracts are Illinois and Georgia. 
See Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 
(Ill. 1979). 
 99. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.01 (West 2009); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Kohler 
v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 
1980) (written contracts). 
 100. See, e.g., Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 79 (Ct. App. 1993) (“services as a 
social companion and hostess” insufficient consideration because they “are not normally 
compensated and are inextricably intertwined with the sexual relationship”); Whorton v. 
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410 (Ct. App. 1988) (claim for services as “companion” 
severable from services for “chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, partner and business 
counselor”). But see Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1981) (promise to be 
“lover” rendered entire agreement, including domestic services, unenforceable). 
 101. Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 313 (2006) (citing TONI IHARA, RALPH WARNER & FREDERICK 
HERTZ, LIVING TOGETHER: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES 3/3 (12th ed. 2004); 
KATHERINE E. STONER & SHAE IRVING, PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS: HOW TO WRITE A FAIR AND 
LASTING CONTRACT 2/7 (2004)). 
 102. See Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410. 
 103. Posik, 695 So. 2d at 762; see also Forrest v. Ron, 821 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002) (mother promised to move in with father of her child for a reconciliation period 
if he promised to pay for her to reestablish her own residence if it did not work out). 
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In addition to express contracts, several states permit cohabitants to bring limited 
claims based on implied-in-fact contracts. Even if the parties never expressed 
promises orally, a court may infer from their conduct that they intended to exchange 
services with the expectation of compensation.104 Plaintiffs alleging implied-in-fact 
contracts face special hurdles. Due to their “special relationship,” a cohabitant may 
have to rebut a presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously.105 In 
addition, some states limit implied-in-fact contract claims to business or commercial 
services between cohabitants, expressly excluding domestic services.106 
2. Conscriptive Rules 
Estin identifies three groups of states that apply property-sharing rules to 
long-term cohabitants.107 First, California, West Virginia, and Wisconsin apply a 
“generous” theory of implied-in-fact contracts.108 Even if the couple did not intend 
to exchange services for compensation, a court may order support payments or a 
division of property if the couple’s conduct manifested a mutual intention to share 
property or support one another long term. This theory has radical potential because 
it does not rely on an exchange of promises, promissory reliance, or unjust 
enrichment. However, several authors have noted that its impact on case law appears, 
at least anecdotally, to be limited.109 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 667 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); Roznowski v. 
Bozyk, 251 N.W.2d 606, 608–09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 
922, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1982). Some courts 
reject the distinction between implied and express contracts, arguing that in both cases the court 
must use the parties’ conduct to infer the precise content of their intended promises. Cook, 691 
P.2d at 667; Hudson, 732 S.W.2d at 928; Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906 (N.J. 
1979), superseded by statute as recognized in Maeker v. Ross, 99 A.3d 795 (N.J. 2014). 
 105. See, e.g., Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (plaintiff 
failed to overcome presumption of gratuitousness to establish implied-in-fact contract); 
Roznowski, 251 N.W.2d at 608. 
 106. See, e.g., Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 751–52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) 
(declining to extend implied-in-fact contract theory to domestic services); Tapley v. Tapley, 
449 A.2d 1218, 1219–20 (N.H. 1982). 
 107. Estin, supra note 86, at 1391–95; see also Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An 
Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 818 n.7 (2005). 
 108. Estin, supra note 86, at 1391 n.64 (citing Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 
1976); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 439 (W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 
313–14 (Wis. 1987)). Wisconsin is more of a joint-venture state, as it “does not recognize 
recompense for housekeeping or other services unless the services are linked to an 
accumulation of wealth or assets during the relationship.” Waage v. Borer, 525 N.W.2d 96, 98 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994). New Jersey once recognized a similarly generous implied promise 
theory, In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838, 845 (N.J. 2002), but those cases were 
overruled by an amendment to the statute of frauds providing that palimony agreements must 
be in writing, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1–5(h) (West Supp. 2014). 
 109. See BOWMAN, supra note 91, at 42–43, 51 (discussing Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 892 (Ct. App. 1993); Ward v. Jahnke, 583 N.W.2d 656 (Wis. 1998); and Waage, 525 
N.W.2d 96); Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1365, 1370–72 (2001) (discussing Friedman). 
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Second, Kansas and Oregon have applied an implied joint-venture theory to 
cohabitants. Analogizing to business partnerships, these states divide cohabitants’ 
property if they intended to manage their assets and expenses jointly for their 
common benefit.110 Living together is evidence that the couple intended to manage 
their resources jointly, but it is less important than holding joint accounts, entering 
into joint transactions, or making “substantial economic and noneconomic 
contributions to the household.”111 If the court finds an implied joint venture, it will 
divide any assets acquired during the cohabitation equitably. This remedy, of course, 
is valuable only to the extent that the couple acquired divisible assets. 
Last, Washington, and perhaps Nevada, have developed an alternative 
status-based regime for cohabiting couples.112 These states will divide cohabitants’ 
property according to community-property rules if the relationship sufficiently 
resembles a marriage (but will not award alimony). Courts evaluate the relationship 
according to traditional marital expectations, such as the duration and continuity of 
cohabitation, pooling of financial resources and services, contributions to joint 
projects, and the purposes of the relationship. The couple’s intent is relevant, but the 
question is not whether they intended to exchange promises but whether they 
intended to adopt an interdependent relationship. In its 2001 Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, the ALI recommended a similar approach. The ALI Principles 
treat an unmarried couple as “domestic partners” if they cohabit continuously for a 
defined period and jointly manage their household; have a common child; or meet a 
number of factors regarding financial independence, intimacy, and public 
reputation.113 Domestic partners and married couples are subject to the same 
equitable division and alimony rules.114 The ALI provision created substantial 
academic controversy and has not been adopted directly by any state. 
Marsha Garrison, somewhat tendentiously, labels these three categories of rules 
“conscriptive” obligations.115 The label is accurate for the new status rules and, 
perhaps, the “generous” implied-in-fact contracts. These doctrines consider the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Estin, supra note 86, at 1391–93; Eaton v. Johnston, 681 P.2d 606, 610–11 (Kan. 
1984); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978). Oregon courts calls these relationships 
“domestic partnerships.” Beal, 577 P.2d at 512. Estin also includes Mississippi in this category 
because the Mississippi Supreme Court appeared to endorse a right to equitable division, 
Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875–76 (Miss. 1986), but Mississippi subsequently limited 
that right to cohabitants who “had . . . either been married [before resuming cohabitation] or 
contended to have married,” Nichols v. Funderburk, 2002-CT-00087-SCT (¶ 11) (Miss. 2004). 
 111. In re Baker, 223 P.3d 417, 421 (Or. Ct. App. 2009); see also In re Greulich, 243 P.3d 
110, 115 (Or. 2010). 
 112. See In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770–71 (Wash. 2000) (en banc); 
Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 835–36 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); W. States Constr., Inc. 
v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992). Nevada’s case law begins with implied-in-fact 
contract theory, Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674–75 (Nev. 1984), but recent cases deemphasize 
the implied exchange in favor of an inquiry into whether the couple “impliedly agreed to hold 
their property as though they were married.” W. States Constr., 840 P.2d at 1224. But see 
Estate of Shapiro v. United States, 634 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpreting Western 
States to require consideration and holding that homemaker services should be sufficient). 
 113. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 50, § 6.03. 
 114. Id. §§ 6.05–.06. 
 115. Garrison, supra note 86, at 324. 
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couples’ intentions but also impose duties on a couple regardless of their intentions. 
Of course, even here, the imposed duties are default rules that the couple can avoid 
through express contracts. The label is more misleading for the implied-contract and 
joint-venture doctrines. These doctrines direct courts to infer the parties’ intent from 
their conduct. The law is not conscripting couples into a status they never 
contemplated but enforcing duties that they assumed with respect to one another. If, 
in fact, a couple avoided marriage precisely to avoid sharing obligations, the law 
should not imply a contract or partnership. 
Nevertheless, insofar as the doctrinal analysis for implied-contract or 
joint-venture doctrines is overinclusive, courts will impose duties on couples who 
did not intend to have them. Joint-venture cases consider factors similar to the new 
status rules, some of which are only loosely related to the couple’s intent to adopt 
sharing obligations. Cohabiting, for instance, is a necessary element in all seven 
states that impose property sharing or support obligations on cohabitants, but living 
together is, at best, weak evidence of intentions to share property or services.116 A 
couple could live together without exchanging services or exchange services without 
living together. Why not ask directly whether they intended to share services? 
Furthermore, some factors bear no clear relationship to sharing intentions. Why must 
claimants be a romantic couple at all?117 
Despite their radical potential, the practical significance of these new cohabitation 
doctrines should not be overemphasized. Reported cases applying these rules are 
sparse, the courts have been hesitant to expand the rules, and the courts tend to 
impose substantial evidentiary burdens for successful claims.118 
3. Restitution  
Last, in recent years, states have expanded unjust enrichment or restitution to 
protect persons who contributed to property held by a cohabitant or provided services 
without payment.119 The cohabitation cases that seem appropriate for restitution 
claims follow several standard fact patterns. Most cases involve real property 
(usually a shared home) and a plaintiff who either transferred the title to his or her 
home to a cohabitant, paid the purchase price or the mortgage for property titled only 
in the defendant’s name, or made improvements to the defendant’s property.120 The 
plaintiff-cohabitant may also have worked for or with the defendant in a family 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. E.g., Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 78–79 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding 
cohabitation is necessary). But see Devaney v. L’Esperance, 949 A.2d 743, 749–51 (N.J. 2008) 
(recognizing theoretical possibility of establishing marriage-like relationship without 
cohabitation but finding marriage-like relationship not present). 
 117. Cf. Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, What is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance 
of Conjugality, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269, 273 (2001) (arguing that sex, once the defining feature 
of the “conjugal relations” accorded state benefits, is now less important under Canadian law). 
 118. See Estin, supra note 86, at 1400; Garrison, supra note 86, at 317–19. 
 119. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Cohabitation and the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1419–24 (2011).  
 120. See, e.g., Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Colo. 2000); Mason v. Rostad, 
476 A.2d 662, 666 (D.C. 1984); Cates v. Swain, 2010-CT-01939-SCT, 2013 WL 1831783 
(¶¶ 18, 20) (Miss. 2013). 
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business.121 In other cases, the plaintiff paid for the couple’s living expenses, such as 
the cost of food or rent.122 The most difficult cases are those in which the cohabitant 
performed domestic services, which freed the defendant to pursue paid wage labor 
and accumulate property.123 
Restitution doctrines have been stretched in various ways to cover some, but not 
all, of these scenarios. In 2011, the ALI adopted the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, which includes a provision relating to 
cohabitants.124 Section 28 provides: 
If two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship resembling 
marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to which the other has 
made substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form of property 
or services, the person making such contributions has a claim in 
restitution against the owner as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment 
upon the dissolution of the relationship.125 
Section 28 is limited to cohabiting relationships that resemble marriage and does 
not extend to other cohabitants, like roommates, or personal relationships, like 
friends, siblings, or parents.126 As noted in its comments, section 28 relaxes two 
general limits on restitution.127 Cohabitants may recover transfers, even if they 
appear to have been voluntary gifts and even if the plaintiff reasonably could have 
negotiated a contractual exchange but deliberately chose not to. The drafters 
concluded that most transfers between cohabitants are made with a reasonable 
expectation of sharing in future benefits and that cohabitants should not be forced to 
enter contracts to avoid assuming the risk that the relationship will fall apart.128 
Estin provides a useful grouping of the factual contexts in which cohabitants 
successfully recover in restitution. Cohabitants receive restitution for money or 
services contributed to the other’s property or business,129 but cohabitants typically 
fail to recover money or services that “can be characterized as part of the ordinary 
give-and-take of a shared life,” such as domestic chores or living expenses.130 Even 
if one cohabitant contributed more to the couple’s domestic life, courts assume that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. See, e.g., Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103–06 (Ct. App. 1998); Suggs 
v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159, 162–63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Harman v. Rogers, 510 A.2d 161, 
164–65 (Vt. 1986). 
 122. See, e.g., Taylor v. Polackwich, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8, 10–11 (Ct. App. 1983); Castetter v. 
Henderson, 113 So. 3d 153, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Ward v. Jahnke, 583 N.W.2d 656, 
661 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). 
 123. See, e.g., Murphy v. Bowen, 756 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Tapley v, 
Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1219–20 (N.H. 1982); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 395 A.2d 913, 919 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1978), aff’d, 403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 
1155 (N.Y. 1980). 
 124. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 (2011). 
 125. Id. § 28(1). 
 126. Id. § 28 cmt. b. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. § 28 cmt. c. 
 129. Estin, supra note 86, at 1399–401. 
 130. Id. at 1400. 
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the couple received a mutual benefit and refuse (as in marriage) to balance their 
relationship ledgers. 
C. The “Abolish Marriage” Position 
The legal literature is full of suggestions to reform the law of intimacy. One 
limited proposal is to replace civil marriage with civil unions, leaving couples or 
religious groups to bestow the title “marriage.”131 Another is to create a “menu” of 
formal statuses, so that couples may choose the rights that best reflect their 
relationship.132 A third, “functionalist” proposal would extend marriage-like rights 
to any relationship with similar characteristics.133 The most radical proposal is simply 
to abolish marriage, along with all forms of legal status for intimate relationships. 
Influential theorists of various political persuasions have floated this proposal, 
including Judith Butler,134 Martha Fineman,135 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler,136 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. See, e.g., TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE 
FOR THEIR DIVORCE (2010); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right To Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 
695 (2010); Mary Lyndon Shanley, Afterword, in JUST MARRIAGE 109, 112–13 (Joshua Cohen 
& Deborah Chasman eds., 2004); Alan M. Dershowitz, Commentary, To Fix Gay Dilemma, 
Government Should Quit the Marriage Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at 15. 
 132. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 606–07 (2013); 
Eskridge, supra note 12, at 1979–85; Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All 
to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1526 (2001). In a variant, Elizabeth Brake 
has proposed to retain the title “marriage” but disaggregate its legal norms and permit individuals 
to register multiple marriages with whatever subset of those norms they prefer. ELIZABETH BRAKE, 
MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 156 (2012). Brake would retain the 
legal status to secure rights with respect to the state and third parties, such as social security or 
employment leave, that support the primary good of “caring relationships.” Id. at 181. 
 133. See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 65 
(2003); Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 225 
(2003); Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship Recognition for Couples Regardless 
of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 LAW & INEQ. 345, 371–72 (2010) 
(positing that functional features include “emotional commitment and involvement; financial 
commitment and entanglement; mutual reliance for personal services including shelter, food, 
clothing, utilities, health care, etc.; how parties in a relationship have conducted themselves in 
their personal lives and held themselves out to society; their level of intimacy; and the totality 
of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring, and self-sacrifice of the parties”). 
 134. JUDITH BUTLER, ERNESTO LACLAU & SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, 
UNIVERSALITY 176–77 (2000). 
 135. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
95–141 (2004); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE 
PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 29, 57 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006). 
 136. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Privatizing Marriage, 91 MONIST 377, 379, 
386 (2008) (recommending replacing marriage with private contracts or, as a second-best 
alternative, with universal civil unions). Their proposal is, understandably, tentative. They 
later endorsed replacing marriage with civil unions as an accommodation to pragmatic 
political concerns. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 215–16 (2008). Sunstein had previously expressed 
a preference to retain marriage. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2117–18. 
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and David Boaz.137 Others have explored the proposal more thoroughly.138 In these 
schemes, individuals may marry as a cultural, religious, or moral matter, but the 
states will no longer license specific types of relationships. These theorists would 
prefer for intimates to regulate their lives through contracts, although some of them 
also contemplate extending fiduciary or partnership law to intimate couples.139 This 
subpart will discuss the proposal to abolish legal status relationships, noting the 
variety of normative concerns and exploring the proposed replacements for marriage. 
The argument for abolishing marriage is that it no longer serves its intended 
functions, in part because those functions are no longer appropriate. A traditional 
purpose of marriage law—perhaps its primary one—was to enforce conventional 
norms regarding sexuality and gender. Marriage was a state license to engage in 
sexual behavior and reproduction, one that society used to enforce its vision of 
correct sexual behavior and gender roles, particularly against women and 
minorities.140 The proponents of abolishing marriage argue that these uses of power 
are morally and legally inappropriate.141 The law should not enforce gendered social 
norms, and adults should have the liberty to engage in sex, bear children, and 
structure their intimate relationships without state interference. 
Of course, no one denies that marriage law could be used to protect dependent 
children and women. However, marriage policy is an inefficient tool for these 
purposes. If the state’s concern is child welfare, supporting marriage is both over- and 
underinclusive. Not all children live with married adults, and not all married adults 
have children. Over forty percent of children born in the United States between 2006 
and 2010 were born to unmarried women.142 Even if a child is born to married 
parents, there is a twenty percent chance that those parents will divorce by her ninth 
birthday.143 Childcare is also not limited to parents, as grandparents are the primary 
caregiver for four percent of children.144 Moreover, while empirical evidence 
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suggests that children benefit from living with two parents, the effect is mediated by 
the quality of the adult relationship. Children raised by parents in abusive or 
high-tension relationships may benefit if their parents divorce,145 and children living 
with lone parents score higher on welfare measures than those living with a 
stepparent or a parent’s cohabitant.146 
Marriage law may even interfere with the protection of women and children. 
Martha Fineman, the most influential family-law scholar to propose abolishing 
status, argues that marriage law distorts public policy with respect to dependents.147 
The public is obligated to care for children, the disabled, and the elderly because 
dependency is a universal human experience, and caretaking is necessary for social 
reproduction.148 Yet, instead of subsidizing caretaking as a public good, marital 
policy shunts this obligation onto private families.149 This privatization of 
dependency reinforces gender inequality because women are the vast majority of 
caretakers, and much of American law assumes a breadwinner family that reinforces 
this gendered division of labor.150 
Last, marriage law can foster forms of direct and indirect discrimination. The title 
“married” has social signaling functions, which can be useful or detrimental. For 
instance, the presumption that marriages are monogamous can ease interactions with 
other adults. These signals can also serve less innocuous purposes. In part because 
people regard marriage as the most significant personal relationship, marriage often 
signifies social achievement. Marriage’s prestige can be used as a tool to exclude 
disfavored groups, which reinforces both marriage’s social status and the privileged 
position of favored classes.151 Opponents of same-sex marriage, for instance, use the 
state’s licensing scheme to denigrate same-sex relationships and, in the process, extol 
heterosexual marriage. Proponents of abolishing marriage argue that any state 
involvement in bestowing titles and benefits on specific relationships reinforces such 
exclusionary practices.152 
In addition, marriage classifies adults into the categories of “single” and 
“married.” Many relationships, from cohabitants to separated spouses to “open” 
marriages, do not fit neatly into this blunt dichotomy. This imprecision can lead to 
unfairness because many state and private benefits are contingent on marital status.153 
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Why, for instance, should one person receive social security benefits from a spouse 
that he never supported, while a second person cannot receive benefits from her 
committed, long-term cohabitant? Similarly, single people receive less compensation 
for the same employment because married persons gain more from insurance 
benefits. Such discrimination might be unfair for two reasons. Some theorists argue 
that, as a general matter, it is wrong to discriminate based on relationship status.154 
More plausibly, discrimination is problematic when relationship status is unrelated 
to the rationale for the underlying benefit. If the state abolished marriage, then 
marriage could no longer be a proxy for these benefits. Either benefits would be 
distributed based only on functionally relevant criteria or individuals could designate 
their beneficiaries. 
In summary, despite otherwise divergent normative agendas, proponents of 
abolishing marriage typically appeal to three core arguments. First, individuals have 
a liberty right to structure their intimate relationships without state interference. 
Second, child welfare is an implausible justification for such interference, because 
the state has more effective and less distorting means to promote child welfare than 
imposing status-based duties between adults. Finally, marriage facilitates gender 
inequality and discrimination based on relationship status.155As is obvious from the 
foregoing summary, these theorists take marriage as their primary target, though they 
support abolishing relationship status generally. 
It is essential to understand what these authors imagine the legal relationships 
between intimates would look like without status relations. (I will expand on this 
discussion in Part III.) For most theorists, contracts play the pivotal role. Libertarian 
reformers, such as Boaz, argue that intimate partners should govern their relationship 
through ordinary contract law.156 In a similar vein, Sunstein recommends contractual 
ordering with tailored default rules: couples could enter contracts, which would be 
supplemented by “a menu of default rules, perhaps intended to mimic what most 
people would do, perhaps intended to force the parties to make their wishes clear, 
perhaps intended to protect those most in need of protection.”157 Even liberal 
proponents of abolishing marriage envision contract law playing the central role. 
Martha Fineman argues that if intimate affiliates “want their relationships to have 
[legally enforceable] consequences, they should bargain for them.”158 
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In addition, Sunstein and Fineman recognize that other areas of law might 
continue to play a role in intimate relationships. Fineman argues that “ameliorating 
doctrines” would be available to alleviate the potentially harsh results of pure private 
ordering on economically weaker parties.159 Adult intimate relationships would be 
governed by general rules of contract, tort, equity, and, perhaps, even partnership and 
labor law. She declines to define this new legal regime in detail, but she does sketch 
a few of its contours. For instance, if a cohabitant provides services without a 
contract, then she can seek compensation through unjust enrichment, partnership 
default rules, or labor regulations. However, any rules devised for these purposes 
must “apply to all types of transactions between legally competent adults and . . . 
specific categories of affiliation [must] not be segregated for different treatment.”160 
Although Fineman acknowledges “pouring disputes that arise between sexual 
affiliates into the arenas of contract, tort, and criminal law would not leave the 
doctrines that now govern those areas of law untransformed,” 161 she offers only two 
examples of the likely transformations. First, tort law might develop ways to 
“compensate sexual affiliates for conduct endemic to family interactions but 
considered unacceptable among strangers,” such as by modifying the “[n]orms that 
prohibit harassment (including stalking), verbal assault, and emotional abuse among 
strangers” so that they could “be applied in defining appropriate conduct between 
sexual intimates.”162 Second, if the state stops trying to limit reproduction to 
marriage, it might decriminalize sexual conduct and permit “enforceable 
individualized bargaining over sex outside of the marital contract.”163 Fineman 
suggests, in conclusion, that traditional doctrines will require reexamination where 
they make “assumptions about interactions between independent, equal, and 
autonomous individuals.”164 
In the next Part, I use these proposals to abolish marriage as a launching pad and 
explore what it would be like to subject intimate relationships to traditional contract, 
tort, and equity law. I do not intend to offer a systematic treatment of the necessary 
changes. Instead, I hope to identify a trend—namely, that even if the law abolished 
ex ante status categories, standard private-law doctrines would still require 
discrimination based on “categories of affiliation.” 
II. IMAGINING A WORLD WITHOUT INTIMATE STATUS 
Abolishing relationship licenses like marriage would not abolish the regulation of 
intimacy based on status; it would simply alter the regulatory regime.165 The state 
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cannot simply get out of the marriage business. As long as intimates can bring legal 
claims against one another in tort, contract, or equity, the law must determine who 
has obligations, how those obligations arise, how they change, and what their default 
content will be—and these legal rules will be tailored to the nature of our 
relationships. If a state abolished intimate-relationship licenses, then private law 
would refashion ad hoc categories of intimate status. In this Part, I describe central 
doctrines in tort, contract, and equity that tailor private-law rights to the nature of 
parties’ relationships and require the law to use status-based norms. To be clear, I am 
not arguing in this Part for regulation through marital status or against regulation 
through private law, only that private-law regulation cannot avoid status-based norms. 
A. Tort 
With few exceptions, the parties’ intimate relationship is largely irrelevant for 
classic intentional torts. Assault, battery, and rape are as wrong when committed by 
an intimate partner as by a stranger (if not worse). The law has evolved slowly to 
reflect this moral equivalence. Every state has now abolished general spousal tort 
immunity. Tort claims for intimate rape or domestic violence remain rare, but states 
and activists are searching for ways to protect these victims.166 
On the other hand, many modern intentional torts and negligence claims are 
explicitly tailored to the parties’ relationship. Some intentional torts protect legal 
rights that are sensitive to the nature of our relationships. These relationship-sensitive 
torts often include a reasonableness element that permits juries to tailor claims to 
case-specific facts about the relationship. Other tort rules impose different legal 
duties on parties with a “special relationship,” including parents, carriers, property 
owners, fiduciaries, lawyers, physicians, and others. Absent fundamental changes in 
tort law, tort claims between intimate couples will require the law to employ 
status-based norms. 
1. Relationship-Sensitive Torts 
Many tort claims necessarily use standards tailored to the parties’ relationship, 
which inevitably involves normative judgments about correct behavior for each type 
of relationship. Status plays this role most clearly for torts that require outrageous or 
offensive behavior. Consider the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(IIED). A plaintiff is entitled to compensation for emotional injuries if a defendant’s 
“extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
harm.”167 Intimate partners are uniquely positioned to harm one another emotionally, 
which makes intimate relationships a natural source of IIED claims. However, to 
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adjudicate an IIED claim between intimate parties, the law must decide what 
behavior is “extreme and outrageous” in the context of their relationship. How could 
tort law make these judgments without status-based norms? I am not the first person 
to raise these questions, of course. 
Ira Ellman and Stephen Sugarman have argued that we should not permit IIED 
claims between spouses because there can be no judicially administrable standard for 
outrageous marital behavior.168 Ellman and Sugarman argue that the law has two 
options, neither of which is acceptable. Extreme and outrageous conduct may be 
defined “internally” according to the parties’ relationship or “externally” according 
to social conventions. The internal standard is meant to respect marital privacy and 
diversity but has the opposite effect.169 The standards of particular relationships are 
too difficult to discern because they tend to be “informal,” “unarticulated” and 
evolving.170 Breakups color the parties’ memories, and the lawsuit creates incentives 
to distort the facts. Faced with such conflicting evidence, fact finders have little 
option but to fill in the gaps using their personal or social norms. An external standard 
of conduct fares no better. A couple may be content with behavior that looks extreme 
or outrageous to outsiders, because relationships involve “complex emotional 
bargains” that may “depart from the social conventions” of ordinary relationships.171 
“Privacy norms” prevent us from holding spouses liable for conduct they believed 
was “within the bounds of the marriage.”172 Moreover, external standards are likely 
abstract, which invites judges and juries to measure conduct using ideal rather than 
minimal standards.173 While this argument dismisses too quickly the possibility of 
minimal objective standards,174 Ellman and Sugarman identify a fundamental 
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1290 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1261 
 
problem. Our beliefs about proper intimate behavior are often indeterminate; 
consequently, the law has difficulty defining even minimal standards of intimate 
conduct without relying on social or moral norms. 
This problem, however, is not limited to marriage or intimate relationships; it 
arises for any IIED claim. Imagine a personal assistant suing his boss, a student suing 
his teacher, or a homeowner suing his neighbor. As the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
recognizes, judgments under the extreme-and-offensive standard require contextual 
determinations about the parties’ relationship, authority, vulnerability, motivations, 
and past conduct.175 Liberal theorists are naturally reticent to articulate or impose 
norms on intimate couples, but there is no viable alternative for IIED claims, even if 
the state abolished formal status categories. 
The law might try to limit consideration to the parties’ explicit intentions. 
However, few relationships (intimate or not) are governed solely or even primarily 
by explicit norms. Our expectations are incomplete. They are abstract, vague, 
mutable, and contextual, and couples often have divergent expectations. This kind of 
indeterminacy is not a problem in personal relationships; couples can fill in their 
expectations on the fly, making contextual judgments based on evolving values. Yet 
this indeterminacy does cause problems for legal enforcement. The law must make 
determinate judgments. The only way for the law to fill in these gaps is to make the 
same type of judgments that intimates ordinarily make for themselves. The fact 
finder must interpret the couple’s relationship in light of the couple’s values and in 
light of normative judgments about what is appropriate for that kind of relationship. 
Similar difficulties arise with respect to privacy torts, such as intrusion on 
solitude. One may sue another “who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, 
upon [his] solitude or seclusion . . . or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”176 Searching another 
person’s closet without his consent is a paradigmatic intrusion on solitude. But is 
such a search equally unreasonable regardless whether the closet belongs to a 
stranger, acquaintance, friend, lover, roommate, or spouse?177 Part of this difference 
can be explained by consent. Once I give someone permission to enter my bedroom, 
his choice to exceed that privilege by searching my closet is less offensive than if he 
lacked consent to enter my bedroom at all. Ultimately, however, privacy torts exceed 
implied consent and rest on shared public conventions.178 Our privacy law begins 
with conventional norms about what one shares with strangers, reporters, employers, 
party guests, friends, roommates, lovers, and spouses. Individuals have the power to 
redraw these boundaries, and that power may even be necessary to form intimate 
relationships.179 Nevertheless, the default boundaries are set by social norms for 
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people in specific kinds of relationships. In the context of privacy torts, the 
reasonable-person standard incorporates these social norms, just as the 
outrageous-conduct standard does for IIED claims. 
2. Tort Law and Special Relationships 
The second class of relationship differences in tort law involves special 
relationships that alter the parties’ duties or the relevant standards of care. The default 
rule in negligence is that everyone has a duty to use reasonable prudence to avoid 
causing harm to others but no positive duty to help or protect others.180 The law 
changes this default for parties with a “special relationship”: carriers and passengers, 
innkeepers and guests, businesses and invitees, employers and employees, landlords 
and tenants, prisons and prisoners, professionals and clients,181 and children and 
parents.182 Special relationships typically arise from voluntary undertakings in which 
the defendant has assumed greater power, has a distinctive ability to prevent injury, 
or has induced the plaintiff into a situation of dependency. These relationships can 
raise or lower the defendant’s standard of care or create an affirmative duty for a 
defendant to prevent harm from befalling the plaintiff. 
If the state abolishes licensed status categories, would intimacy be recognized as 
a special relationship? It might seem odd, if the state abolished formal status 
categories, for tort law to recreate distinctions between types of intimate 
relationships. However, this tension would be inevitable. Even if intimacy does not 
carry special tort duties, negligence law will still regulate intimacy using a 
status-based assumption—namely, that intimate duties are more like duties to 
strangers than to employees, tenants, or clients. Consider, for example, the duty to 
rescue. If intimates are legal strangers, then they have no positive duty to aid one 
another in emergencies. This is certainly contrary to common moral intuitions. We 
have a positive moral duty to aid our spouses, a duty stronger than a carrier’s duty to 
aid passengers. Should a person be liable for not throwing a life preserver to his 
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husband (hopefully now his ex-husband)? The law would have to define the scope 
of this affirmative duty. Should he also be liable for refusing to help pay for his 
husband’s medical care? Similar questions arise for premises liability. Should a 
person be liable for failing to warn her boyfriend about her broken front step? What 
if the boyfriend stayed over regularly for the past month?183 Intimacy is an 
appropriate candidate for special tort duties, since spouses and cohabitants often have 
a unique ability to prevent injuries to one another and a moral responsibility to do so. 
Whether the law decides to treat intimates like strangers or carriers or professionals, 
the choice reflects a status-based conception of our obligations. We rarely think of 
“legal strangers” as a status, but it is a mistake to think that the default status is 
neutral. It is simply the default. 
Assuming that intimates may file tort claims against one another, the state must 
decide how their intimacy affects their rights. In the status quo, tort law’s standards 
for offensive behavior and for reasonable prudence are often tailored to the nature of 
parties’ relationships. If tort law ignored intimacy, intimacy would be the anomaly. 
Moreover, ignoring intimacy would not mean avoiding status distinctions. Choosing 
to limit intimate parties’ tort duties to the minimal standards of legal strangers is itself 
a status-based judgment. 
B. Contract 
Proponents of abolishing marriage contend that if intimates want their relationship 
to have legal consequences, then they should enter contracts.184 As we have just seen, 
relationships often alter tort duties even without contracts. Nevertheless, the 
proponents of abolishing marriage correctly note that spouses and cohabitants 
exchange economically valuable services.185 Couples cook meals, mow lawns, clean 
laundry, fix computers, repair homes, plan vacations, balance checkbooks, make 
investments, and care for one another during illnesses. All of these services could be 
outsourced. Instead, they become bundled into status obligations. Could these 
intimate duties be enforced through contract without intimacy-based distinctions?186 
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While it is more natural to recognize that tort law imposes duties on individuals, 
contract law—the paradigm of voluntary legal obligations—also tailors its rules to 
the nature of our relationships. Ordinary contract doctrines regarding formation, 
interpretation, and remedies inevitably embroil the law in judgments about the 
character of relationships.187 
1. Contract Formation 
Consider, first, what is required for intimate partners to enter binding contracts 
for economic services such as domestic or wage labor. The first hurdle is formation—
offer, acceptance, and consideration. Where are the offer and the acceptance? 
Intimate partners rarely make explicit arrangements for dividing economic services, 
and even when they do, their arrangements fluctuate. Marriage is the closest most 
couples come to a moment of agreement, but few couples have an explicit sense of 
what their marital life will be like. Even sophisticated couples with intricate 
prenuptial agreements rarely divvy up ordinary household tasks. Similarly, 
cohabitants may decide to move in together and make agreements about rent or bills, 
but they rarely negotiate chores. More typically, couples gradually extend the time 
they spend together until they are effectively cohabitants. If intimate partners are 
going to regulate their economic lives by contract, almost all of these agreements 
will be implied-in-fact contracts for which the court infers the parties’ promises from 
their conduct. 
In addition, the provision of economic support (domestic and wage) in intimate 
relationships raises difficulties under standard consideration doctrines.188 Under the 
predominant modern rule, consideration is “the exchange or price requested and 
received by the promisor for its promise.”189 When intimate partners perform 
services for one another, their intention is often precisely not to bargain for 
something in exchange.190 Part of the moral and social ideal of intimate 
                                                                                                                 
 
between intimates without tailoring rules to the nature of their relationship. 
 187. Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott have argued that current marriage law approximates 
the default rules that hypothetical spouses would select if seeking to maximize their 
cooperative surplus. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 
84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1301 (1998). Such arguments support, rather than contradict, my 
position. If contract law needs special default rules for intimate relationships, the state is thus 
necessarily categorizing relationships and regulating their terms. 
 188. Some courts have argued that spouses have a preexisting marital duty to provide such 
domestic support, so that promise cannot be consideration. E.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 16, 18–20 (Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce a husband’s promise to bequeath his 
wife a portion of his separate property if she provided nursing for him in the home rather than 
in a nursing home). This argument has been justly criticized, Silbaugh, supra note 39, at 30–
33, but whatever its merits, it would not apply if the law abandoned a status-based regime of 
marital obligations. Similarly, the modern view on marital and premarital agreements 
dispenses with a consideration requirement, but this is recognized as an exception. See, e.g., 
UPMAA § 6 (2012). 
 189. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 7:2, at 19 (4th ed. 2008). 
 190. One might think of the promise to marry as the exchange, particularly if one restricts one’s 
attention to prenuptial agreements. However, antenuptial agreements or adjustments to the division 
of responsibilities in an ongoing relationship do require additional consideration. See Bedrick v. 
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relationships—at least in marriage-like relationships—is that couples exchange 
services freely, as an aspect of being in the relationship. Couples often expect 
reciprocity and equal contributions, but they rarely price their contributions or seek 
to maximize the return on those contributions.191 Even if the law decides to 
characterize wage or labor services in relationships as if they had been bargained for, 
it is unclear how to characterize the bargained-for benefits. Most couples view 
domestic services as an integral part of their relationship. Spouses share income and 
chores as part of sharing a home and a life. Lovers may agree to cohabitate because 
it facilitates their sexual relationship. Attempts to isolate a particular exchange of 
wage or domestic labor from the wider relational benefits may distort the function of 
the exchange. Contractual consideration cannot be limited to the exchange of unpaid 
and paid labor; if couples were forced to rely on contracts, contract law would need 
ways to identify and value these expected benefits. 
To enter binding express contracts, intimate partners would have to make offers 
regarding financial, homemaking, caretaking, and domestic services. They would 
need to place an economic value on their contributions to the relationship and bargain 
for services in return. Intimates can arrange their domestic lives in this fashion, as if 
they were independent contractors. However, the proposal to abolish legal marriage 
requires them to adopt this stance, on pain of lacking any legal protection when their 
relationship ends. If the goal of abolishing marriage is to avoid imposing status-based 
norms on couples, then it is essential to realize that relying on contract law still forces 
intimates to structure the terms of their relationship to meet the demands of contract. 
2. Contract Terms and Performance 
Consider, next, the likely terms of intimate contracts. To isolate what should be 
an easy case for contractual enforcement, consider a childless marriage between two 
men who have roughly equal salaries, share a home, and want an equal division of 
domestic labor. The terms of their “agreement” would have several notable features. 
First, the couple would be unlikely to bargain for a specific quantity or quality of 
services. How much sympathy would you feel for a plaintiff who claimed his 
husband breached their contract because he agreed to cook meals but skipped one 
day a week? Or worse, because his cooking was mediocre? 
Second, the terms of their relationship will likely come in relatively indivisible 
bundles. Although they might hire distinct landscapers, cooks, or housekeepers, the 
couple are more likely to agree to share these activities en masse. Once they agree to 
share labor, one spouse cannot then outsource his part to a contractor, even if the 
contractor would do a better job. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 27 n.5 (Conn. 2011) (suggesting, without deciding, that postnuptial 
agreements require consideration); Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tenn. 2004). 
 191. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 
24–26 (1999). I am not implying that domestic labor is not economically valuable; this 
argument applies equally to financial contributions through wage labor. Silbaugh, supra note 
39, at 10–11, 26–27 (arguing that both unpaid housework and wage labor have relational and 
leisure components and that injustice results because only housework is equated with 
emotional expression). 
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Third, the terms of their agreement are likely to fluctuate because those terms are 
deeply contingent and open ended. Even if they have divided their tasks equally ex 
ante, ensuring an equal division of labor during a relationship requires significant 
flexibility. The burden of these tasks varies over time: there are fewer dishes when they 
eat out, the yard requires less maintenance in winter, a new home may require more 
work, and wage-work commitments fluctuate. The couple must also decide how much 
they value home cooking, yard maintenance, interior decorating, and their careers. 
These valuations change over time. In ordinary contracts, a promisor assumes the risk 
that the facts or his values will change, altering the cost or value of his bargained-for 
promises. In marriage, however, both spouses face this risk. Indeed, couples often make 
their commitments precisely to survive such drastic changes to the bargain. 
The case is more complicated still. So far, I have assumed that the spouses’ 
exchanges are limited to domestic services of the kind for which there is a market 
substitute. In fact, their exchange of services is one part of a general commitment 
that includes relationship maintenance, shared activities, and emotional and physical 
care. If one spouse fails to participate in these personal aspects of the relationship, 
why not conclude that he has breached the contract? It would be difficult to place a 
value on the domestic services without regard to the relational aspects. If the 
subjective value of a home depends on the presence of his husband, why should he 
not protect that value in a contract? When their domestic services are enforceable in 
contract, then the personal or sexual aspects of their relationship should be 
enforceable as well.192 In one case, a court found that the plaintiff was excused from 
her promise to perform housework because the defendant breached the agreement by 
bringing another woman into their home.193 
If the precise terms of the spouses’ marriage are enforceable, that will affect their 
incentives during their marriage. Each husband would have an incentive to keep track 
of who pays for dinner, cleans the dishes, or mows the lawn.194 They need an accurate 
tally, both because nonperformance can justify a future demand for compensation 
and because sufficient nonperformance can be a material breach that justifies ending 
the relationship and seeking damages. If one partner falls short, the other would have 
an incentive to insist on prompt performance; otherwise, a court might later interpret 
his acquiescence as a rescission of the original arrangement.195 If the personal or 
relational aspects of their relationship are enforceable as well, then those aspects too 
must be monitored. When one stops contributing to the relationship, that breach may 
justify his husband’s decision to breach other aspects, such as providing domestic 
services.196 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. Legal enforcement of sexual or relational aspects of intimate relationships can be 
unsavory. In Spires v. Spires, the court refused to enforce a contract in which a woman 
explicitly agreed to assume a subordinate role and engage in sexual acts intended to be 
degrading. 743 A.2d 186 (D.C. 1999). 
 193. Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 194. Regan has argued at length that individualistic mental accounting is inconsistent with 
intimacy. REGAN, supra note 191, at 70–73; MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE 
PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 146–47 (1993). 
 195. Cf. 3 WILLISTON, supra note 189, § 7:37 (discussing mutual agreement to modify 
contract as a rescission and reentry into a new contract). 
 196. See Posik, 695 So. 2d at 762 (finding cohabitant’s decision to move in with third party 
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Other types of commercial relationships face similar problems: difficulty 
monitoring quality and quantity of performance, provision for a variety of tasks 
through a single relationship, and open-ended obligations whose cost and value 
change over time.197 These difficulties can stump highly sophisticated private actors. 
However, these difficulties do not show that it is impossible or unwise to regulate 
relationships through contracts. Rather, they show that shunting intimate 
relationships into contract law would not end the state’s role in defining intimacy. 
Either intimates would shape their relationships to accommodate contract default 
rules, or the law would reshape contract default rules to accommodate the nature of 
intimate relationships. 
C. Unjust Enrichment and Restitution 
Since intimate relationships rarely meet traditional standards for enforceable 
contracts, it is natural to think that equitable remedies can provide supplemental 
protection.198 Fineman, for instance, suggests that intimate affiliates may use 
equitable doctrines like unjust enrichment to alleviate harsh contract rules.199 
Restitution could become generally available for intimate parties, but restitution law 
openly relies on moral judgments about the nature of our relationships. 
The core of any restitution claim is that (1) the plaintiff conferred on the defendant 
a benefit and (2) it would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain that benefit.200 
Before intimate partners can recover in restitution, the law must explain when it is 
unjust for one intimate to retain benefits received in a relationship. That explanation 
cannot avoid judging parties’ behavior in light of their beliefs about the relationship 
and in light of expectations typical for that kind of relationship. For example, say 
that Caleb and Dan live together for three years with no contract. Caleb takes Dan 
on several expensive vacations and helps build a porch on Dan’s house. When they 
break up and part ways, is Dan unjustly enriched? That depends on what benefits 
Caleb expected and what he could have reasonably expected. The answer turns, in 
part, on whether Caleb and Dan were spouses, boyfriends, lovers, brothers, friends, 
or roommates. One cannot understand such transfers by isolating them from 
judgments about what people owe one another in the context of particular 
relationships. 
                                                                                                                 
 
was anticipatory breach, despite lack of contract language). 
 197. There is vast literature on incomplete contracts, including discussion of various 
avoidable and unavoidable reasons that contracts are incomplete. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A 
Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641–43 (2003). 
 198. Enforceable contracts (whether express or implied in fact) and restitution are 
exclusive remedies, so even a limited relationship contract should preclude recovery under 
quasi contract or unjust enrichment. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 1:6 (4th ed. 2012); 26 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 68:1 (4th ed. 2003). 
 199. Fineman, supra note 135, at 57–58. 
 200. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011); 26 
WILLISTON, supra note 198, § 68:5. 
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The controversy over restitution claims between cohabitants is a controversy about 
the norms and expectations for cohabiting relationships.201 Courts relax two standard 
doctrines of restitution for cohabitants: in this context, retaining a gratuitously 
transferred benefit can be unjust, and restitution can be a substitute for readily available 
contracts.202 The Reporter’s Notes in the Restatement (Third) argue that it is 
appropriate to relax these rules, because cohabitants make transfers expecting that their 
relationship will continue and that they will share in the transferred benefits.203 This 
fact about expectations only begins to answer the fundamental question: Are these 
reasonable expectations that merit legal protection? What behavior should the law 
demand of cohabitants? Professor Dagan argues that restitution should be used to 
facilitate relationships of trust by ensuring that one party to an ongoing relationship 
does not unfairly take advantage of the other’s contributions.204 In response, Professor 
Sherwin argues that cohabitants can easily protect themselves with “off-the-rack” legal 
relations like loans or shared title and that cohabitants should be able to maintain 
relationships with less commitment.205 This debate between Dagan and Sherwin, on 
which the Restatement has taken a controversial position, is about what behavior is 
reasonable in cohabitation relationships. 
If the state abolishes relationship licenses, restitution law will replicate similar 
debates for all intimate litigants. Before a court can decide whether it is unjust for 
the defendant to retain benefits from the relationship, the court must make judgments 
about the level and type of commitment in the relationship. Consider Caleb and Dan 
again. The court must discern the couples’ beliefs about their roles in the relationship. 
Caleb increased the value of Dan’s house by building the porch, but perhaps Caleb 
often did the handy-man work while Dan performed domestic services. Moreover, 
the nature of their relationship colors the nature of the transfer. Assume they have no 
prior division of labor: Caleb’s choice to build the porch appears in a different light 
if they were long-term, committed partners who shared everything than if they had 
an off-and-on-again relationship in which Caleb frequently but unsuccessfully tried 
to get Dan to commit. 
Restitution law cannot avoid interpreting transfers by reference to the terms of the 
couples’ relationship and general norms regarding relationships of that type. Sherwin 
notes that the cohabitation section of the Restatement (Third) requires judges to 
engage in “particularistic” moral judgments about the relationships, in contrast with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. Compare Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status 
to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47, 55 (1978) (arguing that neither cohabitant 
can be unjustly enriched when both “probably contemplated that the benefits they would 
receive—material and non-material—would offset the burdens they undertook” and “[n]either 
party anticipated paying for the material benefits received”), with Garrison, supra note 107, at 
891–94 (arguing that restitution is appropriate when a cohabitant “gains a significant, unearned 
benefit or suffers a significant, uncompensated loss”). Garrison’s test appears relationship 
neutral, but judgments about what is “unearned” or “uncompensated” rest on expectations 
about what cohabitants owe one another in the relationship. 
 202. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 (2011). 
 203. Id. Reporter’s Note cmt. c. 
 204. Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Relationships, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1035, 1038–42 (2012). 
 205. Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 711, 721–22, 727 (2006). 
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the Restatement’s general strategy to define rules for specific factual scenarios.206 
She frames this approach as objectionable, but it is inevitable. A court cannot 
interpret a transfer between cohabitants without understanding their relationship. As 
I argued regarding IIED claims and implied contract terms, judgments about the 
nature of a relationship cannot be restricted to the couple’s express beliefs. Their 
beliefs are often indeterminate until applied using norms about appropriate behavior 
in this type of relationship. 
D. Why Not Simply Refuse To Recognize Status? 
Could there be a more straightforward answer? Maybe private law could simply 
ignore intimate relationships. This proposal seems consistent with the desire to 
abolish formal status categories. It also seems to avoid entangling the state in the 
details of intimate relationships. 
Despite its initial appeal, this proposal is remarkably difficult even to formulate, 
because many causes of action require judgments about appropriate intimate 
behavior. One might argue, as Ellman and Sugarman do for IIED claims, that we 
should prohibit these types of claims between intimate parties.207 This proposal, of 
course, is not relationship blind. It creates a fundamental legal distinction based on 
affiliation. To identify plaintiffs barred from bringing IIED claims, the law must 
distinguish intimacy from other relationships: friendship, roommates, coworkers, 
partnership, employment, etc. Moreover, the proposal avoids imposing legal duties 
on intimates by giving them a unique legal privilege. Intimates would become 
immune from ordinary legal duties, such as to avoid inflicting emotional harm or to 
fulfill implied promises. 
Instead, the proposal might be that intimates can bring these claims, but their 
intimate relationship cannot be considered when evaluating the alleged conduct. For 
example, spouses could bring IIED claims, but judgments about the 
“outrageousness” of their conduct cannot depend on the couple’s marriage. This 
proposal does not obviate the need to categorize intimate affiliates. The fact finder 
must now distinguish which expectations flow from the intimate relationship rather 
than from other legally relevant relationships. Officials must ask a new 
counterfactual question: would it have been outrageous for the parties to engage in 
similar conduct if they were not intimates? Assume a stereotypical fact pattern in 
which a husband demeans his wife while they are in the company of others, locks 
her out of the house, and denies her access to their checking account. Does it make 
sense to decide this case by asking whether such conduct would have been 
unreasonable between friends, housemates, or economic partners? I doubt this 
question can lead to coherent judgments, but even if it could, those judgments still 
involve distinctions based on intimacy. Deliberate ignorance is often self-defeating 
in this fashion. To ignore isolated aspects of the world, you must be particularly 
attentive to precisely those aspects you want to ignore. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. Id. at 731, 735. Sherwin is also concerned that contextual judgments leave too much 
freedom to apply the fact finder’s values and lead to inconsistent results that distort litigation 
incentives. Id. at 733–35. 
 207. See supra notes 168–74. 
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Similar problems would arise in contract law. Officials might try to ignore 
intimate relationships when judging whether one party exerted coercive pressure or 
whether their contract includes unconscionable terms. The law might exempt 
intimate affiliates from these rules or might isolate the legally pertinent features of 
their relationship from its intimate aspects. The first option seems to avoid imposing 
specific duties on intimates. Unfortunately, it does so by imposing one general 
disability: contracts between intimates are limited to their explicit terms. The law 
must still define the category of “intimate relationships” that it subjects to this 
demanding default rule, one that it does not impose on other contracting parties. The 
second option seeks, in quixotic fashion, to isolate the intimate from the nonintimate 
features of a relationship. This is the approach adopted by many states for 
cohabitation contracts.208 When an intimate couple enters a contract, courts may 
consider their promises to share finances and cohabit because nonintimates can 
perform these actions; however, courts must ignore that the couple chose to cohabit 
and share finances in order to facilitate their intimate relationship, even when that 
purpose shapes their behavior and expectations. 
Attempts to render private law blind to intimate relationships are self-defeating. 
The state would need to define categories of intimacy to decide which relationships 
or aspects of relationships are exempt from ordinary law. Contrary to the goal of 
neutrality, this general exemption would continue to define the couple’s legal 
obligations based on their intimate status. 
This extended hypothetical has two lessons. The primary lesson is that abolishing 
formal status categories does not abolish status-based regulation. Intimacy is one of 
many relationships that alter our rights in contract, tort, and equity. If the state 
abolished formal status categories, private law would recreate status norms. Either 
courts would use common-law methods to articulate default rules, or juries would use 
reasonableness tests to enforce conventional norms.209 A state could exempt intimates 
from these private-law doctrines, but that would create a systemic status-based 
distinction. Intimates would be subject to a pervasive legal disability, and the law 
would still have to define the types of relationships subject to this disability. In short, 
abolishing marriage will not get the state out of the marriage business. 
The second lesson is that when parties seek to enforce rights tied closely to their 
intimate relationship, the law oscillates between discerning the terms of their 
relationship and imposing normative judgments on the couple. This oscillation is 
most evident in IIED and unjust-enrichment claims, but it is present in contract law 
as well. The law can try to restrict its attention to a couple’s actual expectations, but 
their expectations are often indeterminate precisely where law demands answers. To 
enforce intimate rights, the law fills these gaps with status-based norms. 
This Part has not explained why private-law rules will inevitably rely on status or 
why legal enforcement oscillates between private and status norms. Nor does this 
Part provide any argument for a legal status like marriage. However, the oscillation 
offers a clue to explaining why the state cannot avoid status norms, and this 
explanation is the next step in reconstructing a liberal justification for marital status. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 208. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 209. Although the drawbacks of these legal processes are apparent, I am not arguing that 
status norms are less objectionable when defined by a legislature than by judges or juries. 
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III. IMPERFECT DUTIES AND STATUS NORMS 
One reason the law cannot avoid using intimate-status norms is that intimate 
relationships involve imperfect duties. The nature of imperfect relationship duties 
forces the law to oscillate between respecting each unique relationship and imposing 
norms on couples.210 This Part defines imperfect duties, explains their inherent 
indeterminacy, and identifies the challenges that they pose for legal enforcement. 
One important caveat: I rely on a deliberately shallow theory of marriage. I 
assume marriage involves imperfect duties, but I hope to bypass theories about the 
value or ground of those duties. Marriage may be valuable because it is a relationship 
of love and self-sacrifice,211 an economic partnership,212 an “egalitarian liberal 
community,”213 or a commitment grounded in natural sex and gender roles,214 and 
marital obligations may be grounded in consent, promises, reliance, dependence, or 
natural law. Instead of engaging these debates, I want to rely on common 
assumptions about the structure of marital duties, substantiated only by appeal to 
widespread marital norms.215 Because I begin with such a contingent conception of 
intimate relationships, one may legitimately worry that the resulting theory of 
marriage law is applicable only to a narrow cultural perspective. I can say little at the 
outset to allay such fears, except that I strive to point out the more controversial 
assumptions. Most importantly, I assume one central limitation: relationship duties 
must be minimally reciprocal. While this premise rules out fundamentally 
hierarchical or patriarchal conceptions of marriage, I regard this as a reasonable limit, 
since my overall project is to reconstruct a liberal justification for legal marriage. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. The oscillation is also exacerbated by family law’s commitment to both liberalism 
and communitarianism and its resulting uncertainty about whether and when the law may 
legitimately impose values on families. 
 211. Wardle, supra note 45, at 122. 
 212. Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1251–
52 (1998). 
 213. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 29, at 81–94. 
 214. See, e.g., Don S. Browning, A Natural Law Theory of Marriage, 46 ZYGON 733, 739–
41 (2011). 
 215. My hope is that this approach allows the argument to serve as a site of overlapping 
consensus between various theories of marriage. See JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133, 134–72 (expanded ed. 2005). Rawls argued that 
even divergent religious and moral perspectives may converge on intermediate premises for 
political decision making. JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra, at 440, 466–74. One might worry that imperfect duties are too 
controversial for this purpose, since the perfect-imperfect distinction is often associated with 
deontological moral theory; however, Mill and other consequentialists have developed 
accounts of imperfect duties broadly consistent with my discussion. See MILL, supra note 9, 
at 61; Douglas W. Portmore, Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options, 46 NOÛS 24 (2012) 
(arguing that many practical reasons are imperfect because they can be pursued in many 
equally rational ways over the course of a life); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, You Ought To Be 
Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation), 15 PHIL. ISSUES 193 
(2005) (arguing that a duty is imperfect if better consequences would result were agents to feel 
ashamed rather than guilty for not performing enough of a type of act). 
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A. The Content and Structure of Marital Obligations 
The day-to-day life of marriage involves a tangle of overlapping moral norms, 
including sexual fidelity, emotional fidelity, economic support (including financial 
and domestic services), emotional support, and relationship maintenance.216 This list 
contains various types of norms. It includes moral rights between spouses as well as 
rights between spouses and third parties. It also includes expectations about spouses’ 
conduct and feelings. These attitudes are less naturally described as rights, but they 
have a similar structure and invoke similar moral attitudes such as guilt, shame, and 
resentment. For instance, spouses should care about one another, so a person may 
feel justly resentful if her wife forgets her birthday, and her wife should be contrite. 
These moralized attitudes often depend on ideals of virtue, such as more or less 
implicit conceptions of the good spouse, boyfriend, friend, or lover. 
While these relationship norms differ in many respects, most of them involve 
what moral philosophers call “imperfect duties.” Imperfect duties have two defining 
characteristics: (1) substantial latitude in the required conduct and (2) an intrinsic 
connection to subjective motivations. While several conceptions of the 
imperfect-perfect distinction exist, their shared insight is that some duties permit 
greater latitude in their performance.217 Perfect duties require or prohibit specific 
conduct. Classic perfect duties include the duty not to murder and the duty to pay a 
debt.218 Imperfect duties, in contrast, leave the agent with greater discretion. She has 
latitude to decide when, how, or how often to fulfill her imperfect duties. Even when 
she recognizes an appropriate chance to fulfill an imperfect duty, she may choose not 
to fulfill it now, in this manner. The most commonly cited imperfect duty is the duty 
of charity. Anyone with excess money should donate to charity sometimes, but each 
person may decide to whom, when, and how much to donate. Moreover, even if a 
person recognizes that a certain cause is worthy of charity, she may choose to forgo 
donating now in favor of supporting other similarly worthy causes in the future.219 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. I harbor no pretenses that this list is exhaustive or that any member is necessary. Many 
marriages lack some of these norms, but anything we commonly recognize as a marriage has 
many of them. If the norms of other intimate relationships lack these features, then the 
argument that I develop for state forbearance and equitable dissolution does not apply to those 
relationships. I make no judgment about the value of those relationships. 
 217. See, e.g., Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation, 62 
KANT-STUDIEN 55 (1971); George Rainbolt, Perfect and Imperfect Obligations, 98 PHIL. 
STUD. 233 (2000). Not all accounts of imperfect duties make latitude their core feature. Mill 
argued that imperfect duties also lack correlative moral claims or claim holders, Mill, supra 
note 9, at 48–49, and some recent philosophers have considered this a defining feature of 
imperfect duties, e.g., ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF 
KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 189–93, 224–32 (1989). This categorization obscures 
important distinctions, because one can have duties to specific persons without determinate 
content and free-floating duties with determinate content. 
 218. As these examples show, the imperfect-perfect distinction is orthogonal to the more 
familiar positive-negative distinction. Perfect duties often require forbearance, such as 
refraining from theft, but can also require positive action, such as paying a debt. Imperfect 
duties often require actions, such as the duty of beneficence, but may also require forbearance, 
such as the duty not to harm the environment. 
 219. Imperfect duties need not be less stringent than perfect duties. Some scholars have 
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Following George Rainbolt, I assume that the imperfect-perfect distinction is one 
of degree.220 All duties admit more or less latitude, and this latitude may vary across 
multiple dimensions of the required conduct. Rainbolt identifies five nonexhaustive 
dimensions: time, place, manner, object or person, and number of required acts.221 
Even perfect duties admit some discretion on some dimensions. A debtor may be 
obligated to pay a particular amount to a particular person by a particular date, yet 
the debtor may retain discretion to choose whether to pay early or on the due date 
and whether to pay in a lump sum or in installments. Likewise, no imperfect duties 
are fully indeterminate. Imperfect duties have minimal thresholds. While I have 
substantial discretion to decide how much money to donate and which charities to 
support, I fail my obligation if I donate only a pittance or donate only to worthless 
causes. Moreover, even a wide imperfect duty may require specific action in 
particular factual contexts. For instance, a parent’s duty to support his child’s 
development is imperfect, but if he has not attended any of his daughter’s sporting 
events this year, then he is obligated to attend her final soccer match. 
Most marital duties involve latitude that places them on the imperfect side of the 
scale. The marital duty with the least latitude is likely sexual fidelity (assuming there 
is such a duty). Spouses are obligated not to engage in or pursue sexual acts with any 
third party. The category of sexual acts may be vague, but one could argue that spouses 
should avoid even borderline sexual acts. Aside from sexual fidelity, most marital 
duties involve significant latitude. Spouses have a duty of economic support, but they 
may choose what quality of life to maintain, what kind of services to provide, and how 
integrated they want their economic life to become. The duty of emotional support 
offers still more latitude. Spouses may expect one another to perform some caring acts, 
but they must find ways to support one another and judge when such support is 
appropriate. The duty to contribute to the relationship permits even more latitude, 
including discretion to decide which activities to share, how many, and how often. 
Despite this latitude, marital norms often have corresponding claims and 
claimholders.222 For example, one owes emotional and financial support to one’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
argued that perfect duties always trump imperfect ones, because a perfect duty will require 
specific action while imperfect duties will permit action on some other occasion, e.g., Susan 
C. Hale, Against Supererogation, 28 AM. PHIL. Q. 273, 276 (1991), but such arguments 
conflate precision with stringency. The category of supererogatory acts is also sometimes 
conflated with imperfect obligations. But see Marcia Baron, Imperfect Duties and 
Supererogatory Acts, 6 ANN. REV. L. & ETHICS 57 (1998) (arguing against this conflation). 
 220. Rainbolt, supra note 217, at 238–42. 
 221. Id. at 247. 
 222. Many marital duties have correlative “claim rights” in a strict Hohfeldian sense: A has 
a claim right against B that B must perform some act if and only if B has a duty to A to perform 
that act. See GEORGE W. RAINBOLT, THE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS 25–30 (2006) (presenting a 
contemporary definition of Hohfeldian claim rights). I assume here that one’s spouse is the 
correlative duty holder. It is an open question whether spouses might also have a duty to the 
state to fulfill their marital obligations, a question I do not consider here. In addition to claim 
rights, spouses also have privileges and powers with respect to one another. A has a privilege 
to do some act if B has no right to prevent A from doing it. For instance, Caleb has a privilege 
to open Dan’s closet if and only if Dan has no right that Caleb not open the closet. Spouses 
also receive certain powers to alter one another’s rights and duties. Caleb can accept a dinner 
invitation for the couple, creating a weak duty for Dan to attend. 
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spouse. When Caleb’s father dies, Caleb can expect, request, and demand support from 
his husband Dan. A third party can remind Dan of his duty to support Caleb and judge 
Dan’s character poorly for failing to do so, but the third party cannot demand that Dan 
fulfill his duties. Not all duties have corresponding claim rights in this fashion. Often, 
no one has a right to demand that we fulfill our duties. Importantly, many of the classic 
imperfect duties lack correlative claim holders. I have an imperfect duty to give to 
charity, but no particular charity can demand that I donate to it. Imperfect marital 
duties, however, cannot plausibly be understood in this fashion. 
Nevertheless, the frequent latitude in imperfect duties translates into slack in the 
correlative moral claims. Because the person subject to an imperfect duty often has 
discretion to decide how, when, or how often to perform, the claim holder generally 
has no right to demand a specific kind, time, or amount of performance. Even when 
some occasion presents a clear opportunity to fulfill an imperfect duty, the agent may 
forgo performance, as long as she plans in good faith to fulfill the duty on another 
occasion or in another manner.223 For example, Amy may skip her wife Beth’s family 
reunion to fulfill work obligations, as long as she plans to attend family holidays. 
Beth may be justly disappointed, but she has no right to demand that Amy attend the 
reunion. This latitude in imperfect duties leaves individuals substantial discretion to 
specify the precise content of their own marital duties and rights. 
The example of Amy and Beth also illustrates the second major feature of 
imperfect duties: imperfect duties are tightly connected to subjective moral 
motivations. This subjective commitment requires doing enough and doing it in the 
right way. For example, parents have a duty to support their children’s development. 
This duty does not require a single-minded focus on their children’s activities. 
However, a father can reveal his lack of commitment either by missing too many 
recitals or by attending the recitals yet never putting down his smartphone. The father 
may deeply wish for his son to do well, but he has placed some other value above his 
son’s musical development. Accordingly, we should add a second aspect to our 
definition of imperfect obligations: subjective commitment. Agents manifest their 
subjective commitment by performing sufficient acts of the relevant type in an 
appropriate manner. 
A similar requirement attaches to marital duties. Spouses may often forgo 
opportunities to fulfill their imperfect marital duties, but if they do not do enough or 
if they fail to maintain proper attitudes, then they are not truly committed. This is a 
trope of romantic comedies: A workaholic frequently cancels date night with his 
wife, but she forgives him because she understands how much he values his work. 
Yet her patience finally snaps when he spends an entire date on his phone. The 
hapless husband thinks she is overreacting, but in fact, she has concluded that he is 
no longer committed to their marriage. Even if he loves her and wants to remain 
married, he has not made their marriage a priority in his life. By exercising their 
discretion to judge how and when to fulfill their imperfect duties, intimates define 
their vision of the relationship and demonstrate their commitment to it. Spouses need 
                                                                                                                 
 
 223. Philosophers disagree about whether one may forgo an opportunity to perform 
imperfect duties only if one will instead fulfill competing duties, or whether one may forgo 
the opportunity simply to pursue other inclinations. See THOMAS E. HILL, JR., HUMAN 
WELFARE AND MORAL WORTH 220–22 (2002) (discussing the debate). 
1304 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1261 
 
discretion to act in ways that express their commitment, and their commitment is 
what constrains the latitude in their conduct. 
Admittedly, this weak notion of subjective commitment is uninspiring. Yet greater 
elaboration would mire us in controversy about the nature of the commitment 
underlying imperfect duties—and marital duties in particular. Kant offers the most 
influential theory of imperfect duties, and he explains their underlying commitment as 
adopting an end. The categorical imperative requires all rational agents to adopt certain 
ends, in particular self-development and the happiness of others.224 A duty is imperfect 
when agents have “playroom . . . for free choice” about how to fulfill these ends.225 
More precisely, a duty is perfect if the proposed action would always be inconsistent 
with adopting the required end and imperfect if adopting the end requires some action 
without determining precisely how or to what extent one must act.226 Extending this 
account to marriage (though Kant did not), one might argue that marriage involves each 
spouse adopting the other’s ends. Whether marital conduct is morally worthy depends 
on whether it is consistent or inconsistent with adopting one’s spouse’s ends as one’s 
own.227 Because it is usually possible to support another person’s ends in numerous 
ways, marital duties will rarely generate strict rules of conduct. 
Most of us crave a more romantic account of the subjective commitment 
underlying imperfect duties. We expect romantic love. This love-based conception 
of marriage, despite its recent vintage in Western life, is now pervasive.228 Spouses 
expect one another to act in ways that manifest affection. This expectation can affect 
judgments about imperfect duties. It is not sufficient to throw a party for your 
spouse’s birthday; the day needs to have especially personal or romantic moments. 
Despite the prominence of this ideal, romantic love is not necessary for intimate 
relationships. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine long-term, personal 
relationships without pervasive emotional attachments. A full theory of marriage 
must explain how adopting ends, love, and care relate to moral duties in adult, 
intimate relationships. My argument, however, will rely only on the more limited 
notion of subjective commitment described above. This minimal account is 
consistent with a broad range of moral visions for marriage. Recognizing that this 
assumption is controversial, I regard the adoption of ends, love, and care as 
specialized versions of, or supplements to, this minimal sense of commitment. 
This subpart has offered a skeletal account of moral rights and duties in 
marriage-like relationships. Marriage creates imperfect marital duties and rights, yet 
these duties and rights leave spouses with substantial latitude in performance. This 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224. KANT, supra note 9, Ak. 6:384–88, at 516–20. 
 225. Id. Ak. 6:390, at 521. 
 226. Id. Ak. 6:390–91, at 521–22; see also HILL, supra note 223, at 206 (explaining that to 
adopt an end means to make it “a serious, major, continually relevant, life-shaping end”). 
 227. Kant regards marriage as primarily a legal contract to use one another’s bodies, 
because he argues that a mutual exchange is the only way to rightfully use a person’s body. 
KANT, supra note 9, Ak. 6:277–80, at 426–29. The Kantian theory that I sketch, in contrast, 
makes marriage look more like a special case of beneficence. Id. Ak. 6:469–73, at 584–88. 
 228. See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: HOW LOVE CONQUERED 
MARRIAGE (2005) (describing social, economic, and legal conditions that allowed love-based 
marriage to evolve and come to dominate between the late eighteenth and twentieth centuries). 
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latitude is constrained by the requirement that spouses maintain appropriate 
subjective commitments. 
B. Legal Enforcement of Imperfect Obligations in Ongoing Relationships 
Imperfect duties are a chronic hassle for legal enforcement. Because agents have 
discretion to determine the content of their duties, the law struggles to define rules 
and identify violations. Moreover, the state’s coercive mechanisms conflict with the 
subjective commitment that justifies and limits the agent’s discretion. These 
difficulties have led preeminent philosophers, including Kant and Mill, to conclude 
that imperfect duties are not legally enforceable.229 This Part explores the difficulties 
created by efforts to enforce imperfect obligations. These difficulties are particularly 
salient in light of enforcement in ongoing relationships. 
1. Discretion and the Specification of Duties 
The latitude in imperfect obligations causes the first, and most serious, problem. 
Because spouses have wide discretion in imperfect duties, it is often impossible, in 
principle, for a third party to specify the content of those duties. Spouses can fulfill 
their duties in different ways on different occasions. Even if a spouse recognizes that 
a particular occasion is an appropriate chance to fulfill her duty, she may choose to 
forgo performance, as long as other opportunities will arise. When an act or omission 
falls in this zone of discretion, a third party simply cannot determine whether the act 
or omission fulfilled the agent’s imperfect duty. 
On the other hand, third parties may be able to identify blatant violations. 
Imperfect duties have lower thresholds. Sometimes, anyone who can reasonably 
claim to be committed to performing a duty must avoid or perform certain actions. 
One way to clearly violate an imperfect duty is by failing to act over a significant 
amount of time. For example, no one could claim to be committed to supporting his 
husband’s career while never attending any of his husband’s work events.  In the 
right circumstances, even a single act or omission can clearly violate an imperfect 
duty. For instance, no one can be committed to supporting her spouse financially 
without trying to help meet her spouse’s basic needs.230 
Absent conduct outside the realm of acceptable latitude, however, it is impossible 
for a third party to judge whether specific acts or omissions violate imperfect marital 
duties. Consider Caleb and Dan again. Dan wants to buy a new house, but Caleb 
wants to invest the money for retirement. Dan files a lawsuit claiming that Caleb’s 
refusal to buy the new home violates his duty of financial support. A new home, Dan 
argues, would be more consistent with their standard of living. A third party cannot, 
in principle, resolve this dispute. The problem is not epistemic. The problem is not 
that a third party would have difficulty identifying the couples’ agreement or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 229. KANT, supra note 9; MILL, supra note 9. 
 230. Disputes will inevitably arise about the lower limit of this vague threshold, as one 
might argue that a minimally decent home required indoor plumbing in 1953. See McGuire v. 
McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 338, 342 (Neb. 1953) (stating that husband had duty to maintain 
home but holding that choice whether to provide indoor bath, toilet, or kitchen fell within 
discretion to decide minimal standard of living). 
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deciding whether a new home is appropriate for their agreed-upon standard of living. 
The problem is that Caleb and Dan have discretion to choose how to fulfill their 
support obligations in light of their desired standard of living and allocation of 
resources. Ideally, Caleb and Dan would decide jointly. But until they make that 
decision, there is no precise answer about what level of support Caleb must provide. 
If, in contrast, Caleb had refused to help Dan buy basic groceries, then one could 
reasonably conclude that Caleb is not committed to fulfilling his support obligations. 
A state could press the point and try to enforce imperfect duties in this zone of 
discretion. To specify the duties’ precise content, a conscientious official might ask 
what decision the couple would have made outside a dispute. Unfortunately, this 
counterfactual judgment has no clear answer. The official might use the couple’s past 
practices to project their future decisions. However, they made those past decisions 
assuming that they would have future opportunities to reinterpret the relationship and 
adjust its terms. Their past arrangements do not govern the present dispute. Any attempt 
to reconstruct the couple’s hypothetical decision will require judgments about the best 
shape for the couple’s ongoing relationship based on external standards: the official’s 
values, community standards, or a hypothetical rational couple. 
The discretion in imperfect intimate duties explains why the law cannot avoid 
status and why legal judgments vacillate between contextual decisions and status 
norms. To adjudicate intimate disputes, a fact finder must settle the couple’s 
disagreements about their imperfect duties. These legal decisions inevitably require 
judgments about how couples ought to live. At best, the law can judge the parties’ 
relationships in light of their past conduct and general norms for that type of 
relationship. Not incidentally, this is what the couple does for themselves when 
considering their intimate duties. 
2. Coercion and Commitment 
The second problem with enforcing marital duties relates to the connection 
between imperfect duties and subjective commitments. Imperfect duties require 
agents to act on certain subjective commitments, whether adopting a particular end 
or acting out of love.231 These commitments determine whether a discretionary act 
fulfills an imperfect duty. Because it is impossible to force a person to maintain 
commitment, it is impossible to coerce someone to fulfill imperfect duties. At best, 
the law can force a person to complete acts consistent with the imperfect duty. 
This difficulty is a variant of a familiar problem: virtue cannot be coerced. Legal 
coercion is a blunt instrument. Legal sanctions alter individuals’ motivational sets by 
creating new incentives to act one way or another. However, the law cannot force a 
person to act for a particular reason or on a particular motive.232 Only deeply intrusive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 231. See supra Part III.A. 
 232. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
758–59 (2010); Heidi M. Hurd, When Can We Do What We Want?, 29 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 
37, 57–58 (2004). My point is limited to discrete acts of enforcement; I do not deny that legal 
coercion can be designed to cultivate motivations over the long term. See Danny Scoccia, 
Moral Paternalism, Virtue, and Autonomy, 78 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 53, 55–56 (2000). 
Perhaps a general threat of coercion could incentivize short-term compliance for the wrong 
reasons, and this compliance could habituate spouses to eventually act for the right reasons. 
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coercion or long-term education can make someone act on a particular motive. Of 
course, this problem will apply to perfect moral duties as well, if complying with 
perfect duties requires acting on appropriate moral motivations. The conflict with 
enforcement of imperfect duties is distinct, however, because the subjective 
commitment is essential to determining whether the external conduct satisfies the duty. 
For a similar reason, litigation is inimical to imperfect obligations. If acting on 
the right sort of commitments is constitutive (at least in part) of fulfilling marital 
duties, then it is difficult to sue while also asserting that the relationship still exists. 
Marital litigation is both conceptually and psychologically difficult, but only the 
conceptual difficulty is significant. 
Take the conceptual problems first. To claim that a spouse violated his marital 
duties, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to assert that the defendant failed to fulfill 
his marital obligations on a few occasions or in the manner the plaintiff expected. 
Such choices are within the latitude of imperfect duties. To file a valid suit, the 
plaintiff must assert that the defendant failed to meet even the minimal thresholds of 
a marital duty. The law can police these minimal thresholds, assuming it is possible 
to identify some acts that are necessary to qualify as committed at all. However, the 
plaintiff’s assertion that his husband fell below this minimal threshold entails that his 
husband is not subjectively committed to the relationship. To bring a valid claim to 
enforce marital duties during a marriage, a plaintiff spouse must simultaneously 
assert that his spouse has abandoned the marriage. Moreover, the lawsuit assumes 
his spouse will not fulfill his marital obligations without coercion. If legal sanctions 
are necessary to induce the defendant to perform his marital duties, then even if he 
complies with the legal judgment, he is not acting for the right reasons or with the 
right motives and, hence, not fulfilling his imperfect duties.233 The plaintiff spouse 
seeks to deprive the defendant of the discretion necessary to exercise his 
commitment. A person who performs services ordered by an authority out of 
concern for sanctions is, at best, a servant or employee. Not only is the plaintiff 
spouse asserting that the defendant is no longer committed to the marriage, the 
plaintiff is seeking to create a relationship in which the defendant spouse cannot 
participate in the marriage.234 
                                                                                                                 
 
Such an institutional perspective is not, however, the one typically adopted by individuals 
seeking to vindicate their legal rights. 
 233. Suppose that Caleb refuses to contribute at any household chores, and Dan sues to 
enforce his imperfect marital rights. If Caleb merely performs the chores ordered by a judicial 
decree, then he is acting in ways consistent with what some committed spouses might do, but 
he is not living out of his commitment. His conduct can exhibit his commitment only if he is 
free to choose the nature of his performance. 
 234. Nonlegal enforcement mechanisms can, but need not, involve a similar conceptual 
tension. Self-help and social sanctions work best when both spouses are committed to the 
relationship and care about one another’s feelings. A guilt trip is most effective when the other 
person cares about your feelings, so that even grudging performance is evidence of remaining 
commitment. However, nonlegal enforcement can cross the same line. Even if Caleb no longer 
cares about his marriage to Dan, Caleb may refrain from marital misbehavior simply because 
Dan’s guilt trips are annoying or because Caleb would be ashamed in front of his friends. If 
Dan realizes that he must rely on self-help or social sanctions in this way, he faces the same 
dilemma as when he relies on legal sanctions. 
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Litigation also creates psychological tension. As is often noted, litigation 
encourages an adversarial posture that conflicts with the motives for affection and 
cooperation. The tension is real but is not a fundamental problem. It may not apply 
to particular couples and specific disputes. Moreover, as Mary Anne Case has 
argued, couples often use psychologists or religious counselors to negotiate 
disputes.235 The psychological tension created by litigation is not qualitatively 
different from the tension created by nonlegal enforcement. In addition, although our 
legal system is adversarial, that is not a necessary feature of legal interventions. 
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms might reduce the conflicting incentives 
of the adversarial process. 
3. Vagueness in Imperfect Duties 
These first two problems exacerbate a third, practical problem. Many intimate 
duties are irreducibly vague—that is, they involve concepts with indeterminate 
borderline cases.236 For instance, spouses should help clean their shared house, but 
assistance comes in degrees, and there is no precise threshold for distinguishing 
sufficient from insufficient assistance. Ordinarily, vagueness is not a serious challenge 
for law. Many legal duties are vague, and the law has standard strategies to construe 
vague duties. Unfortunately, these standard legal methods are ill suited for imperfect 
intimate obligations because of the two conceptual problems described above. 
The law sometimes resolves vague duties using reasonableness tests. For instance, 
in a commercial requirements contract, a purchaser has a right to buy any number of 
units it needs for each installment, as long as the order is not “unreasonably 
disproportionate” to a prior estimate or normal prior amounts.237 If the parties litigate 
this issue, the fact finder must judge whether the request was reasonable in light of 
the parties’ past practices and commercial standards in the relevant community.238 
Such reasonableness tests give a third-party fact finder authority to make judgments 
in the vague boundaries. The state could use similar reasonableness tests to resolve 
vague marital duties. For example, a fact finder might specify how much support 
each spouse must provide by asking what standard of living is reasonable for the 
couple, based either on the fact finder’s judgment or on community standards for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. Case, supra note 37, 250–55. 
 236. The indeterminacy in vague concepts is distinct from the indeterminacy in imperfect 
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 238. Cf. Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When 
the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving 
the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 590–600 (1996). 
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similar couples. Of course, this procedure runs into the first problem described 
above: it requires a third party to make the discretionary judgments about imperfect 
duties that spouses entrust to one another. Having the power to make such 
discretionary decisions is part of being in a marital relationship. 
A second legal method swings to extreme deference. Sometimes the law ignores 
the content of an agent’s decision, unless there were flaws in the decision-making 
process. For example, courts will not review business judgments by corporate 
directors unless the directors lacked any relevant information or had a conflict of 
interest.239 A similar rule holds little promise for marriage. Marriage lacks any 
natural decision-making procedures, and only an implausibly strong duty of loyalty 
would require spouses to put marriage before all other loyalties. In marginal cases, 
questions about a duty of loyalty would replicate the substantive question. Does a 
spouse violate her duty of loyalty if she decides to forgo a lavish vacation to support 
her adult child, friend, or charity?240 
For still other vague duties, the law limits judicial review to nonvague cases. This 
result can be achieved by codifying the minimal requirements or by lowering the 
standard of review. For example, child-protection agencies will intervene to enforce 
a child’s rights to adequate care when her parents deny her life-saving blood 
transfusion but not when they refuse potentially life-saving vaccines.241 The law 
might treat vague intimate obligations similarly—in fact, this approach has been 
adopted by states that enforce a duty of support to prevent “neglect.”242 
Unfortunately, this approach runs headlong into the second conceptual problem 
described above: it proposes to enforce imperfect duties during the relationship only 
if the defendant’s performance is so deficient that it demonstrates he has abandoned 
the commitment that defines the relationship. It is somewhat perverse to create a 
cause of action during relationships while limiting it to contexts in which the 
relationship is substantively over. 
Last, the law might enforce imperfect marital obligations only insofar as spouses 
formalize them in express or written agreements. This compromise was adopted by 
the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, 243 but such a compromise has 
several flaws. First, explicit agreements can be equally vague. Spouses might agree 
                                                                                                                 
 
 239. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 88–89, 100 (2004) (arguing that the business judgment rule is a 
second-order rule against judicial review absent bad faith or procedural errors, rather than a 
liability rule that lowers the standard of care or an evidentiary rule placing the burden of proof 
on plaintiffs). 
 240. A duty of loyalty is essential when the marriage is winding down. Doctrines about 
diminution of the marital estate rely on similar fiduciary theory. Spouses may ordinarily use 
marital assets for personal ends, but spouses face greater restrictions on personal use of marital 
assets when the relationship is likely to end soon. See Kittredge v. Kittredge, 803 N.E. 2d 306, 
313 (Mass. 2004). 
 241. John Alan Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling 
Patients, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 868 (2006); Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding 
Around: Restructuring Non-Medical Childhood Immunization Exemptions To Ensure Public 
Health Protection, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277, 282–83 (2003). 
 242. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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explicitly to the standard package of vague marital duties. Instead, the proposal must 
be to enforce only express agreements relating to nonvague duties. Spouses may not 
agree to provide one another with domestic support, for instance; instead, they must 
agree to a precise division of domestic labor. This proposal is more workable but still 
flawed. Most important, it mischaracterizes intimate duties. Under this proposal, 
intimates can have enforceable obligations only if they transform their imperfect 
duties into perfect ones. Presumably, they do that by agreement. The only obligations 
the law will enforce are explicit promissory obligations, even if intimate duties have 
another moral basis, such as reliance, status, or love. In addition, this proposal can 
result in unfairness. It enforces only intimate obligations capable of and likely to be 
the subject of express agreements. Spouses often make agreements about division of 
property but ignore questions created by the division of domestic and wage labor. 
Why enforce certain aspects and leave others floating in the wind? 
The law cannot avoid imposing intimate-status norms on couples, because 
intimate relationships involve imperfect duties. To render legal judgments, a judge 
or jury must supplant the couple’s discretion with its own normative judgment and 
replace the couple’s subjective commitment with coercive sanctions. Mill and Kant 
argued that these conflicts mean that imperfect duties, as a general matter, are never 
legally enforceable.244 That is an overstatement. Intimate rights can be enforced 
(even in private law), but doing so requires officials to exercise legal authority that 
conflicts with aspects of ongoing relationships. Marital status, in contrast, provides 
a more flexible way to create enforceable imperfect duties. 
IV. MARITAL STATUS AND IMPERFECT LEGAL DUTIES 
Intimate relationships involve rights and expectations that deserve legal 
protection, yet these rights and expectations cannot be enforced without imposing 
status norms on couples. Marital status offers a way to manage this tension. The law’s 
refusal to enforce marital rights during marriage avoids displacing the spouses’ 
discretion and commitment, while its egalitarian and equitable divorce remedies 
protect marital rights in ways consistent with their imperfect nature. These two 
aspects of marital status combine to create a legal framework for imperfect legal 
rights. Marital status allows spouses to maintain indeterminate legal duties without 
losing legal protections. 
The core of this argument, and a central contribution of this Article, is a limited 
defense of the intact-marriage rule—the rule that spouses cannot sue to enforce 
marital rights until they separate. 245 Tort, contract, and equity have no analogous 
rules. The default rule in private law is that individuals can sue to vindicate their 
legal rights without repudiating their underlying legal relationship.246 There is ample 
reason for skepticism about the intact-marriage rule, especially given its historical 
pedigree. Accordingly, subpart A clears away some underbrush, explaining and 
rejecting traditional justifications for the intact-marriage rule. Subpart B argues that 
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a combination of the intact-marriage rule and egalitarian dissolution rules offers a 
way to create legal remedies for imperfect duties. To be clear, I am not arguing that 
marriage is a law-free or state-free space. The law cannot avoid relying on status 
norms; the question is when and how to do so. Moreover, my aim is not to defend 
marriage law in its entirety, but to articulate the implicit rationale behind its general 
structure. Once clear, this rationale may justify revision of particular legal standards. 
A. The Intact-Marriage Rule: Historical Justification, Contemporary Objections, 
and Responses 
The history of the intact-marriage rule offers ample reasons to be wary. The 
intact-marriage rule developed in the coverture regime. Coverture’s patriarchal 
norms supplied its first rationalization: a married woman’s legal personality was 
subsumed into that of her husband, so allowing her to sue him would be like allowing 
him to sue himself.247 Similar doctrines were used to rationalize the civil and criminal 
spousal immunity that gave husbands legal permission to use their wives’ bodies.248 
Even into the late twentieth century, the law continued to protect domestic abusers 
with privacy doctrines249 and spousal rapists with an assumption that consent to 
marriage was blanket consent to sex.250 The process took far too long, but the law 
has largely eliminated the fiction of legal unity and most of its remnants, including 
spousal immunity. These formal changes do not ensure protection, but they are a start. 
They also have significant expressive meaning. A spouse’s right to bodily integrity is 
as strong with respect to her spouse as to strangers. Any contact with another person’s 
body without consent is a battery, and marriage no longer serves as a blanket proxy for 
actual consent. Moreover, the right of bodily integrity can be enforced during 
relationships. A person can sue his or her spouse for battery or negligence committed 
during the marriage and can even sue without a legal separation.251 
In light of these changes, one might have expected the intact-marriage rule to 
dissolve as well. Yet it persevered, though its primary rationale shifted. 
Contemporary courts reason that the intact-marriage rule protects marital privacy.252 
Privacy is a deeply ambiguous concept in legal discourse, but none of the senses of 
marital privacy convincingly supports the intact-marriage rule.253 
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“Privacy” often refers to spatial or informational privacy.254 A couple enjoys 
marital privacy in this sense if they have a physical space secluded from intrusion or 
if information about their marital life is shielded from disclosure. However, the 
intact-marriage rule does little to protect physical spaces such as the marital home. 
Marital rights are unenforceable during the relationship, regardless of where those 
rights are pertinent—the home, market, or workplace. This confusion between 
enforceability and spatial privacy is facilitated by the rule that marital duties are 
enforceable after spouses separate. However, separation here is a spatial metaphor. 
Spouses can live in the same residence while being separated or in different countries 
without being separated. What matters is when they stop being a couple, which is a 
normative relation. 
The intact-marriage rule also does little to shield information about spouses’ lives 
from public disclosure. One might argue that lawsuits require spouses to reveal 
sensitive information about their relationship, and if inter se claims were common, 
then spouses might be discouraged from sharing freely. However, the intact-marriage 
rule offers only modest protection for private information. A spouse may bring the 
same claim after separation, and this lawsuit will involve as much if not more 
disclosure. Moreover, an unhappy spouse may air the couple’s secrets during their 
marriage and, because of the intact-marriage rule, will often remain immune from 
liability until they separate. 
Privacy, particularly in American law, has an additional meaning because of the 
due process right to privacy. When the Supreme Court held in Griswold that the 
Constitution protects married couples’ rights to access contraception, the majority 
latched onto the idea that laws banning contraception threatened to invade the marital 
bedroom and disclose information about marital sex lives.255 While concern for 
spatial and informational privacy influenced the Court, the due process right to 
privacy is now recognized as a misnamed liberty right against government 
interference with specified actions.256 The intact-marriage rule might be thought to 
protect marital privacy in this sense of decisional autonomy. Indeed, the central 
intact-marriage cases express concern with the court determining how the family (or 
the husband) decide to spend their resources.257 
Noninterference offers a more promising start, but here one must be careful. The 
constitutional right to privacy protects individuals from unwanted governmental 
interference. In litigation between spouses, governmental interference is not a 
significant concern. The plaintiff is asking the court to intervene. The spouses have 
reached an impasse, and at least one of them wants the court to define and enforce 
their duties. It is no response at all for a court to say that the government should not 
interfere out of respect for their marriage. The spouses disagree about their respective 
marital rights. Refusing to clarify and protect these rights does not demonstrate 
respect for their marriage—indeed, the plaintiff is likely to conclude that the court is 
not taking her marital rights seriously. 
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Nevertheless, the intact-marriage rule could be a policy designed to reduce the 
government’s role in ongoing marriages more generally. On this theory, the state 
refuses to enforce marital rights in order to facilitate a specific conception of 
relationships, either one that the state prefers or one it assumes that couples prefer. 
The intact-marriage rule facilitates a conception of relationships within which it is 
preferable for spouses to interpret and enforce their own marital rights. Spouses 
either compromise or separate. The intact-marriage rule is not about immunity or 
privacy or respect for the individual litigant’s marriage—it is about the state’s refusal 
to intervene to settle and enforce ongoing spousal obligations so that spouses may 
decide for themselves the nature of their relationship.  
Feminist scholars have objected that such marital autonomy does not benefit 
husbands and wives equally. When the law refuses to enforce marital duties, it 
empowers husbands to fill the vacuum of state power with physical, economic, and 
social power.258 This feminist objection is partly correct, particularly in the 
common-law states that allocate control of assets during marriage based on title. 
Nevertheless, the force of this objection is blunted once one sees the role of the 
intact-marriage rule in the broader system to enforce imperfect marital duties, as I 
describe in Part IV.B. Accordingly, I want to respond to this feminist argument here 
on its own terms, at least sufficiently to forestall the objection. 
I have encountered two versions of the argument that the intact-marriage rule 
disadvantages women. The first, simpler objection is that the intact-marriage rule 
places an unfair burden on injured spouses. The victim-spouse (usually the wife) is 
forced to choose between relinquishing her marital rights to retain the marriage and 
vindicating her marital rights by abandoning it. In contrast, the offending spouse 
(usually the husband) may continue violating his wife’s marital rights while 
maintaining the benefits of marriage.259 
Despite its initial plausibility, this argument relies on an incomplete framing of 
the problem. The fairness of a rule that denies unhappy spouses legal enforcement 
cannot be judged entirely ex post. Elizabeth and Robert Scott have offered a more 
persuasive and subtle analysis.260 They argue that two hypothetically rational spouses 
would select a rule against legal enforcement of marital rights during the marriage.261 
Whether spouses should prefer intramarital legal sanctions depends on whether such 
“formal sanctions would provide a more efficient substitute for, or a complement to, 
informal normative sanctions.”262 Spouses have three informal mechanisms to 
encourage cooperation: internalized norms, self-help, and social sanctions.263 
Spouses internalize moral norms about caring, promising, and fairness,264 which they 
can reinforce with a self-help reward for cooperation or punishment for defection.265 
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When moral motives and cooperative incentives are not enough, spouses can appeal 
to social enforcement. 266 Friends, extended family, coworkers, and churches 
encourage cooperation and censure inappropriate behavior. Signaling tools like 
engagements, weddings, and rings encourage social recognition, monitoring, and 
enforcement.267 In some cases, couples may use pastors or psychologists for informal 
adjudication through counseling and mediation.268 
Compared to these informal mechanisms, legal enforcement is a blunt instrument. 
Scott and Scott argue that each couple’s highly specific pattern of cooperation, 
defection, and retaliation usually leads them to settle on “highly contextualized and 
precise” rules for distributing the benefits of their marriage.269 A third party is 
unlikely to adjudicate disputes about these interactions accurately or efficiently. 
Moreover, “[l]egal adjudication is structured as a single iteration zero-sum game,” 
which leads parties to adopt an adversarial posture that conflicts with the “harmony, 
reciprocity, and solidarity” needed for cooperative relationships.270 Scott and Scott 
conclude that a rational couple would choose not to permit “intramarital” legal 
enforcement because it would provide few additional incentives to cooperation.271  
The Scotts’ more complete story responds to the simple objection, but it opens the 
door to a more targeted criticism. Mary Anne Case has argued that the lack of legal 
enforcement in marriage fosters gender inequality: because gendered relationships 
remain the social norm, couples with egalitarian relationships have weaker moral and 
social incentives.272 A husband who fails to fulfill his equal bargain will feel guilty 
for breaking his promise and shameful for failing to fulfill his ideal, but he can 
assuage his conscience by thinking he did more than most men do.273 Moreover, the 
community is unlikely to reinforce his guilt. Pastors, counselors, family, and friends 
are likely to substitute their own conventional gendered norms for the couple’s 
uncommon expectations.274 Judges, on the other hand, are more likely to enforce 
egalitarian relationships, both because judges have internalized legal norms about 
enforcing agreements and resisting discrimination and because trial judges are 
subject to appellate review.275 Legal enforcement of marital rights during marriage 
(at least those derived from marital bargains), Case argues, would help empower 
spouses who adopt egalitarian relationships. 
While I am open to greater enforcement of express marital contracts, I remain 
suspicious of the more general claim about enforcement of intramarital duties 
generally. Enforcement is a double-edged sword that would involve the law in 
unequal bargains. Divorce law’s current rules tend toward equal treatment and could 
be reformed to support greater substantive equality without sacrificing formal 
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equality or autonomy. Divorce law could, for instance, help alleviate the gendered 
division of labor by increasing protection for a caretaking spouse’s reliance interests. 
In contrast, if spouses may enforce marital obligations during relationships, then 
family law would have to face a stark choice between equality and autonomy. Many 
couples live in traditional, gendered relationships.276 The state would either lend its 
coercive power to enforce these unequal marital arrangements or bluntly impose 
egalitarian default rules on more traditional couples. This choice is another instance 
of the tradeoff repeated throughout this Article, particularly in Part II. 
The law of marriage has stumbled upon a way to finesse this choice. The 
intact-marriage rule is not a simple preference for marital autonomy that sacrifices 
spouses’ equality. The law does not abstain from enforcement during marriage so 
that couples may define the relationship as they see fit. Rather, the law’s choice to 
abstain during marriage is tied to the scheme of remedies it offers at dissolution. The 
law defers enforcement so that spouses can maintain the discretion necessary to have 
imperfect duties, but it can pair this deferral with equitable remedies at divorce that 
preserve the spouses’ equality. 
B. Enforcement of Marital Obligations at Separation and Divorce 
Despite the limits of the existing justifications for the intact-marriage rule, it is 
part of a sensible legal approach to imperfect marital duties. Unlike attempts to 
enforce marital rights directly on analogy with tort or contract law, the 
intact-marriage rule avoids displacing the couple’s discretion and commitment 
during their marriage. The intact-marriage rule does eliminate legal protections, 
however, because it is simply one part of a larger scheme of imperfect legal duties. 
The law replaces enforcement during marriage with protection of spouses at divorce. 
The remaining questions, then, are as follows: (1) why do postseparation remedies 
not face the same problems as enforcement during marriage, and (2) what kind of 
divorce remedies can reconcile deferred rights with the parties’ equality?277 
1. Why Separation Marks a Categorical Divide 
Why does separation mark a categorical divide? One possible explanation of the 
categorical divide is that intimate obligations are conditioned on the existence of the 
relationship. Intimates owe one another relational duties only while their relationship 
continues. To pursue this argument, one would need a full theory of marriage to 
explain why some, but not all, marital duties are conditional. Separation extinguishes 
the duties of fidelity and domestic support and weakens the duty of emotional 
support, but separation also triggers the duty of financial support. In addition, the full 
theory would need to explain how these conditional marital duties interact with 
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unconditional ones. For instance, a theory that conceives of marriage primarily as an 
exchange of wage labor for domestic labor must explain why the former, but not the 
latter, is enforceable after the marriage. 
A more plausible justification is that the state abstains during marriage to respect 
the parties’ imperfect duties, but their separation undercuts the two conceptual 
problems with enforcing imperfect duties. First, once spouses separate, the state need 
not worry about usurping their power to define their relationship. The couple no 
longer entrust one another with latitude in specifying their imperfect duties. The 
actions they have taken in the past to fulfill their imperfect obligations are set. They 
no longer have privileged authority to interpret their past conduct or relate it to their 
future performance. After their separation, if the parties disagree about their marital 
obligations, the state cannot defer to either spouse’s beliefs. For example, because a 
separated couple has abandoned their project of shared finances, neither spouse can 
claim authority to decide how to allocate the duty of financial support between their 
current and future needs. Of course, a divorce court must still interpret their financial 
obligations. The interesting question, which I tackle below, is how a state should 
decide which norms to use. 
Second, after a couple separates, the state need not worry about interfering with 
spouses’ abilities to act on the right kind of motivations. Separation ends the 
subjective commitment that underlies imperfect duties in intimate relationships. This 
distinction explains, in part, differential treatment of intimate duties. Some duties, 
such as the duties of care and fidelity, involve such extensive latitude that motivation 
plays a decisive role in identifying sufficient performance. Whether an outside 
attachment is inconsistent with marital fidelity is a contextual judgment, admitting 
of few if any general rules. One can say little more than that spouses should avoid 
emotional entanglements that interfere with their commitment to one another, unless 
the parties expressly define their required conduct. For duties like this, terminating 
the relationship ends the duty. Other intimate duties, however, are less inextricably 
tied to the motivation for the required conduct. The duty of financial support permits 
less latitude than the duty of fidelity, so its boundaries are less dependent on the 
underlying motivations. 
While separation removes the two conceptual obstacles to legal protections for 
imperfect marital rights, the practical problem of vagueness remains. However, we 
saw four potential responses to vague rights: reasonableness tests, procedural tests, 
low standards of review, and enforcement of explicit agreements only.278 Separation 
does not remove the potential unfairness of the fourth method, but it does alleviate 
the problems with the other three. Reasonableness tests and procedural tests are 
problematic during the relationship because they replace the parties’ discretion with 
that of a judge or jury. In postseparation litigation, however, there is no alternative 
to substituting some third party’s judgment for the parties’ discretion. Separation also 
removes the tension between trying to enforce only fundamental failures (nonvague 
instances) while maintaining the relationship. After the separation, of course, this 
conceptual tension no longer exists. 
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2. Which Dissolution Norms Are Appropriate 
If separation marks a categorical divide because it ends the couple’s discretion 
and commitment, what implications does this have for the appropriate remedies? The 
dominant scheme of divorce law in America is equitable division with egalitarian 
presumptions.279 Judges have discretion to divide property “equitably,” with a thumb 
on the scale for equal divisions and with the ability to offset unfairness with ad hoc 
property adjustments and alimony awards.280 The rationale for the intact-marriage 
rule supports—in broad strokes—this core structure of the divorce law. Equitable 
distribution rules give judges flexibility to effectuate spouses’ marital duties when 
they are discernible, while egalitarian presumptions recognize that—from the state’s 
perspective—spouses enter and exit marriage as equal citizens. These two aspects of 
modern divorce law are a coherent response given the state’s lack of enforcement 
during the relationship. 
Equitable distribution schemes give judges authority to interpret the couple’s 
relationship.281 As we saw in Parts II and III, this is an unavoidable feature of legal 
protection. The state defers protection during the relationship so couples can define 
their imperfect marital duties, but in the divorce context neither spouse’s disputed 
beliefs about their relationship can be controlling. Equitable distribution rules entrust 
judges to look at the relationship as a whole and determine each spouse’s intimate 
duties. Typical statutes list up to fifteen relevant factors, including various 
dimensions of need, the parties’ contributions, and their marital standard of living.282 
The statutes rarely explain, however, what weight judges should give to each factor 
or how the factors interact.283 Rather than isolating specific transactions, the statutes 
encourage judges to view the couple’s relationship as a whole. In short, equitable 
distribution gives courts wide discretion to try to discern how the parties have 
allocated their respective imperfect obligations, both now and in the future.284 
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Despite equitable discretion, the modern tendency is toward equal divisions.285 
What justifies this egalitarian default? One cynical answer is that equal division is 
easier, but I think there is a deeper reason. The answer lies in the spouses’ 
transformation from legal strangers to a married couple and back. From the state’s 
perspective, spouses are—first and foremost—citizens. The law can justifiably 
assume that its citizens enter, maintain, and leave marriage as equals. During 
marriage, the state suspends ordinary private law so that spouses can commit to a 
comprehensive relationship characterized by imperfect duties. At divorce, when 
spouses seek to resume their status as legal strangers, the state should not let one 
spouse unfairly benefit from the decision to suspend the ordinary rules that ensure 
citizens’ formal equality. Accordingly, the state’s egalitarian default rules need not 
be justified as a way to encourage egalitarian or partnership marriages.286 Rather, 
egalitarian default rules can be justified as a fair way to disentangle lives intertwined 
through unenforceable obligations. 
Another way to see the appropriateness of an equitable regime with egalitarian 
defaults is to imagine the alternatives. Formulated as ideal ends of a spectrum, the 
law’s alternatives are (a) to enforce the precise norms of the couple’s relationship or 
(b) to impose the state’s view of appropriate relationship norms. Why not enforce, as 
best one can, the terms of the couple’s actual marriage? Because doing so would be 
inconsistent with the legal status of their relationship. 
The absence of enforcement during marriage enables spouses to regulate their 
relationship through imperfect duties that resist enforcement through private law. It 
would be incongruous for the state, then, to strive to identify and enforce the latest 
terms of a couple’s relationship, as if they were ordinary private litigants after all. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the state might simply impose on divorcing couples 
its preferred conception of appropriate long-term relationships. That vision might be 
a liberal egalitarian community, a partnership model of marriage as a labor-division 
tool, or a traditional model of marriage as a lifelong bargain for mutual support. Yet 
insofar as the state is willing to impose its normative vision at divorce, it is less clear 
why the state should be willing to forbear during the relationship. Instead, equitable 
distribution schemes permit the law to enforce intimate duties insofar as they are 
discernable, filling in the large gaps using egalitarian default rules based on a 
presumption of equal citizenship. 
Relationships involve claim rights, but those claim rights correlate with imperfect 
duties that leave intimates significant discretion regarding the manner, time, and 
occasions for performance. By exercising their discretion, intimates define their 
vision of the relationship and demonstrate their commitment to it. Legal enforcement 
of ongoing intimate duties conflicts with maintaining the relationship, replacing the 
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intimates’ discretion with the court’s judgment and their commitment with sanctions. 
This conflict supplies a legitimate reason—albeit not a definitive one—for a state to 
defer enforcement of intimate rights during ongoing relationships. Deferring 
enforcement enables intimates to maintain a relationship characterized by imperfect 
duties, leaving them space to define their relationship. Once the couple separates, 
these reasons lose most of their force, because the spouses have abandoned their 
commitment and its accompanying discretion. Legal divorce norms can be guided by 
the same reasons that justified deferring marital rights. The egalitarian defaults express 
the state’s view that neither party should take unfair advantage of the period of deferred 
legal protections, while the equitable discretion allows judges to tailor their rulings 
when the parties exercise their discretion to adopt clear expectations. This basic 
structure of marital status—deferred protection and egalitarian dissolution—enables 
spouses to maintain legal relationships defined by imperfect duties. 
CONCLUSION 
The state cannot abolish marriage, in the sense of abolishing status norms. Of 
course, a state could abolish marriage and other intimate licenses, but then private 
law would either recreate similar intimacy categories or create a systemic exception 
for “intimate relationships.” Tort, contract, and equity incorporate status distinctions 
because intimacy carries special duties that presumptively affect legal rights. Yet this 
incorporation of intimacy into private law presents a recurring problem: How can 
officials enforce indeterminate intimate rights without imposing normative 
judgments on intimate parties? 
A closer look at intimate duties explains why the law cannot avoid status norms. 
Many intimate norms are imperfect duties, which leave intimates wide discretion to 
decide how and when to act, subject to a duty to remain subjectively committed to 
fulfilling their duties. These imperfect duties play havoc with legal enforcement, 
especially during a relationship. Legal enforcement requires officials to supplant 
individuals’ discretion to specify their imperfect intimate duties and their subjective 
commitment to the relationship. The only way to specify these imperfect duties is to 
categorize the parties’ relationship and make moral or social judgments about 
appropriate behavior in that type of relationship. 
Marital status offers a reasonable resolution of this dilemma by coupling deferred 
protections with equitable remedies. By deferring protection until the relationship 
ends, the state avoids displacing couples’ discretion and commitment. Once a couple 
separates, they abandon their commitment and discretion, so divorce courts may 
exercise authority to protect the couple’s marital rights and expectations. Divorce 
law uses equitable and egalitarian remedies—not because the law assumes marriages 
should be equal but because such remedies can maintain the formal equality between 
spouses when the ordinary protections of private law are suspended. Marital status 
enables couples to adopt relationships of imperfect legal duties. 
  
